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PREFACE 
The students in the 1977 /78 class of the Graduate Program in Navy Executive Man-
agement, offered and conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 
participated in a Seminar on Science, Technology and Public Policy, The seminar was of-
fered four hours per week for eleven weeks. Twenty-seven government employees who 
were employed by the Naval Air Systems Command, and were members of the Naval 
Aviation Executive Institute, participated in the masters level program. They had been 
selected for the program because of their high potential as managers and because of their 
past superior performance as members of middle management. The students had civil 
service ratings of GS-13, GS-14, or GS-15. All had undergraduate degrees, which in most 
cases were in one of the scientific areas. A few of the students had masters degrees in 
scientific subjects. 
The format of the seminar was built around invited guest speakers, tapes of speech-
es, and discussions of readings. 
During the final weeks of the seminar, each student was asked to write an essay. The 
instructions were as follows: "The essay should be developed by a review of known facts 
and strengthened by quotations and/or paraphrases from several articles and/or books 
listed in a bibliography. (The bibliography was distributed to the class.) The essay should 
lead to a logical conclusion either resulting from original thinking or based upon the sug-
gestion of some properly referenced work.)" 
Ten of the twenty-seven essays were selected for the chapters of this book. They 
cover a rather wide range of thought and make what we believe to be a substantial contri-
bution in presenting the development of thought that resulted from a very intensive 
academic experience. 
(1) The first essay, "Technology Interactions with Public Policy," was written by 
William Eurlem. The concept that technology is sometimes curtailed by public policy is 
not new. Burlem has, however, developed a model of public policy that gives an insight 
into the relationships among the stages of national development and technological prog-
ress. The concept discussed in the essay may provide a better understanding of the stage 
of advancement of any developing nation. 
(2) John Sweeney in his essay, "Technology and Economics: Problems or Answers," 
probes the underlying cause of the present energy and pollution problems. What is the 
relationship of technology and economics? Sweeney has hypothesized that much of the 
problem lies outside of known relationships and can be best described as errors of public 
policy. Public policy can distort the relationship of technology and economics to such 
an extent that a major dilemma can occur. 
(3) The third essay, "Technology: No Policy for Giants," by Milton Olsen discusses 
the concept that technology is a momentous giant, growing, subdividing and causing per-''· 
sistent changes. The theme presented by the author suggests that it should be possible to 
use our advanced management technology to generate systems to set public policy and 
consequently manage and direct our technology toward purposive benefits for mankind. 
( 4) The fourth essay, "International Technology Transfer: Ramifications Concerning 
Communist Bloc Nations," by Howard Fish, causes the reader to review the position of 
the U.S.A. as a source of technology for the world. Although security and economic fac-
tors are important, his essay looks at the impact of technology on traditional cultural 
patterns. The examples in the discussion are the People's Republic of China and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A critical inspection of technology processes in these 
two dominant nations elicits consideration of our public policy. 
(5) The fifth essay selected for this book has the title, "The Effect of Climate on 
Food Production and Population." Its author, Theodore Elsasser holds the premise that 
any change in the world climate would be catastrophic. He reviews the inputs to the par-
adigm. This review clearly illustrates the intense sensitivity of the system and how 
technology has disrupted its equilibrium. Elsasser suggests a mandate for survival. 
iii 
(6) The mood of the people of the U.S.A. is not one of confidence and anticipation, 
but one of concern for the long-term survival of human beings, according to James 
Thaler. His essay, "World Population Explosion: A Technological, Not Fertility, Crisis," 
argues that it is necessary to adopt a public policy to reverse technological colonialism 
induce economic growth in order to resolve the existing crisis. 
(7) Joseph Rezin has prepared an innovative essay, "The Computer: It Leadeth Man 
to Think." In the past, unless a public figure had a scientific background, he would not 
have been schooled in the systems approach to problem solving. Rezin observes that the 
future may be quite different. The computer drives all educated people into a form of 
disciplined thinking. This concept has implications for public policy decisions. 
(8) The eighth essay, "Computers, Privacy, and the American Public," by Kenneth 
Suess, reminds the reader that we have only ~een the initial impact of the computer on 
our society. New technology must attain a balance between benefit to man and the threat 
to his survival. During the first twenty-five years of the computer, one undesirable impli-
cation has been the threat to privacy. This is a ppblic policy issue which is effectively 
reviewed by Suess. 
(9) Public policy tends to reach into unexpected areas of the manager's prerogative; 
at least, this is the view of many managers. William Winner, in his essay, "Product Liabil· 
ity, and How the Engineer and Small Business Manager Can be Prepared," presents a 
careful discussion of the background of the problem and some logical recommendations 
on how to prepare for the future. 
(10) Solar energy is emerging as a technological concept of major importance to our 
society. Peter Hughes discusses one aspect in his essay, "Solar Heating of Homes-A Tech-
nology Assessment." According to Hughes, it is highly likely that, as a result of public 
policy, we will eventually live in a solar energy controlled climate. He presents arguments 
to support this view. 
The essays speak for themselves. Iri total, they present the perceived mood and direc-
tion of the interrelated forces bounded by science, technology and public policy. 
They are enjoyable reading, providing an informative, thoughtful, and significant 
contribution to the literature of technology transfer. As editors, it is with sincere appre-
ciation that we extend thanks to each of the authors whose essays appear in this book. 
Printing of this book was made possible through the cooperation of the Naval Aviation 
Executive Institute. 
Monterey, California 93940 J. A. Jolly, Ph.D. 
J. W. Creighton, Ph.D. 
Bonita M. Moore, MP A 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines past and projec-
ted interactions between technological 
developments and public policy. Three 
stages are suggested: 
Stage I - Technological feasibility 
shapes public policy. 
Stage II - Technology is curtailed by 
public policy. 
Stage III -- Technology is utilized in 
support of public policy. 
Stage I began with the industrial rev-
olution, and phased out as Stage II com-
menced immediately after World War IL 
While the character of Stage I was primar-
ily positive, that of Stage II is negative. 
Stage III has yet to be entered. Prerequi-
site to this stage is the formulation of 
national goals and objectives. 
This final stage will yield the great-
est benefits to society from technologi-
cal developments due to an integrated 
scientific/social approach to the achieve-
ment of consensus national commit-
ments. 
OBJECTIVE 
"Progress is our most important pro-
duct." Sound familiar? How about "As 
we move into the decade of the seventies 
we have the greatest opportunity for pro-
gress at home of any people in world his-
tory ." (President Nixon, 19 7 0 ). 
"Progress" means different things to 
different people depending upon their 
perspective. In the former instance, one 
presumes that making the American kit-
chen (and the lives of company stock-
holders) less labor-intensive is "progress." 
In the latter, one guesses that "progress" 
means an improvement in the equally 
vague "quality of life." Nor is Websters' 
New Collegiate Dictionary of much help 
in coalescing possible meanings: 
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"Progress 1. To move forward; to pro-
ceed. 2. To develop to a higher stage." 
Forward to where? What higher stage? 
While an old Chinese statement that 
"Progress is made by the constructive 
confrontation with obstruction" (Dhiegh, 
19 7 5, p. 4 8) is beautifully presented, it 
suffers from the same presumption that a 
purpose for progress is apparent. 
The possibility of dissention is signif-
icantly reduced when politicians espouse 
"progress" while leaving the interpreta-
tion of its direction to the listener. It is 
in the political arena, however, where the 
lack of clearly specified targets for social 
progress has created a vast 'milling about' 
in the application of national resources to 
social needs. It is particularily disturbing 
to note the effort being expended upon 
the transfer of technology from the pub-
lic to the private sector with neither 
guidelines on national objectives nor in-
centives to apply the technology to such 
objectives. Therein lies the theme of this 
paper. 
The stages of homogeneous inter-
actions between technology and public 
policy will be defined and the ultimate 
state will be projected. The prerequisite 
to this stage - the establishment of 
national goals - will be examined, and a 
simple dynamic systems model proposed. 
TaE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
TECHNOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 
It has been stated that the distingui-
shing feature of our time is technological 
development. The interactions of these 
developments and public policy can be 
classified in three stages: 
1. The shaping of public policy 
by technological feasibility. 
IL The curtailment of technology 
by public policy. 
IIL The utilization of technology 
in support of public policy. 
The first stage can be considered to 
have begun with the industrial revolution. 
During this stage, the major choices 
among future national programs were 
largely technological rather than political. 
The feasibility of the automobile as a 
transportation means, for example, shap-
ed the public policy for road-building, as 
did the feasibility of technically and eco-
nomically viable commercial passenger 
aircraft generate a public policy for con-
structing airports and air traffic control 
networks. Without conscious attention 
to what was happening, these two devel-
opments have evolved into the key 
elements of our present national trans-
portation system, making their attendant 
air and noise pollution problems and their 
warping influence on the shape of the 
cities doubly difficult to solve and caus-
ing a critical dependence upon foreign 
sources for their vast fossil fuel demands. 
Countless examples spring to mind where-
in technical feasibility was equated to 
social desirability without much serious 
question. The technological successes 
(and excesses) of this stage created the 
serious social problems which set the 
scene for Stage II, which is now in effect. 
This stage began to develop after 
World War IL The overlap of Stages I and 
II is illustrated by the irony of accelera-
ting city freeway construction (Stage I) 
coincident with increasing public con-
cern for "smog" in the cities (Stage II). 
While the first stage was characterized by 
a positive attitude toward technology, the 
second is characterized by a negative one. 
One cannot help but surmise if the pen-
dulum has not swung too far. However, 
Toffler asserts: 
At the same time it is undeniably 
true that we frequently apply new 
technology stupidly and selfishly. In 
our haste to milk technology for im-
mediate economic advantage, we 
have turned our environment into 
a physical and social tinder-box, 
(Toffler, 1970, p. 429). 
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Elsewhere in that same reference, Toffler 
has an excellent description of the mech-
anics of Stage II: 
Vie can no longer afford to let 
such secondary social and cultural 
effects just happen. We must at-
tempt to anticipate them in advance, 
estimating, to the degree possible, 
their nature, strength, and timing. 
Where these effects are likely to be 
seriously damaging, we must also be 
prepared to block the new technol-
ogy. It's as simple as that. Technol-
ogy cannot be permitted to rampage 
through the society, (Ibid, p. 438). 
These views are given a quasi-official 
stamp by the National Goals Research 
Staff (NGRS, 1970, p. 27): 
But today there is an explicit chal-
lenge to the view that we can or 
should continue to encourage or 
permit the unfettered growth of our 
economy, population, technology, 
use of materials and energy, flow of 
new products, and even of our 
scientific knowledge. 
So we see the essential nature of 
Stage II as functionally negative. It is 
typified by the word "consumerism." 
The future in the near term is to be pre-
dicted by considering both the technolog-
ical probabilities and also our projected 
success in overcoming obstacles which are 
socially or politically significant. 
It must be kept clearly in mind that 
the discussion is about thwarting technol-
ogy, not science. As stated by Michael 
Polyani (Shils, 1968, p. 9): 
You can kill or mutilate the ad-
vance of science, you cannot shape 
it. For it can advance only by essen-
tially unpredictable steps, pursuing 
problems of its own, and the practi-
cal benefits of these advances will be 
incidental and hence doubly unpre-
dictable. 
It would be unfortunate in the reactivism 
of Stage II if confusion in terms resulted 
in efforts to deny the acquisition of 
knowledge (science), as well as its applica· 
tion (technology). The terms are often 
used interchangeably in the literature. 
In any event, while this policy stage 
may control technology, it won't enlist 
it for the public good. For that, one 
must emerge from the cocoon of Stage II 
as the butterfly of Stage IIL 
Stage III, now just as evanescent on 
the horizon as a desert mirage, will be 
characterized by a conscious effort to 
harness technology positively in the pub-
lic interest. Whereas technology initially 
shaped policy, in this ultimate stage pub-
lic policy will shape technology -
not negatively by amputating it, as in 
Stage II, but positively by encouraging its 
growth in areas applicable to social objec-
tives. And it won't come by our anticipa-
ting the bad side effects of emerging tech-
nology and preventing their occurrence, 
but by our identifying long-range desir· 
able social effects and causing them to 
happen. 
A prerequisite to Stage III is the au-
thoritative establishment of clearly defin-
ed and positively adopted future national 
goals and objectives. 
TH£ CREATION OF 
NATIONAL GOALS 
& OBJECTIVES 
Lederman (19 71, p. 6 ) cites the fol· 
lowing definitions by the Committee for 
Economic Development: 
Goals are 'statements of highly desir· 
able conditions toward which society 
should be directed,' while objectives 
are 'the stated purpose of an organi· 
zation - or an individual - capable 
of planning and taking action to gain 
intended ends.' They are generally 
more limited and more specific than 
broad goals, and are frequently quan· 
titative. 
Traditionally, our leaders have assur-
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ed us of their concern for social progress 
with such broadly-phrased goals as the 
"New Deal" or the "Great Society"; but 
they generally have left us unburdened by 
specific objectives and the means of 
attaining them. However, the need for 
national goals and objectives has been rec· 
ognized by past and present public and 
private groups and has resulted, predict· 
ably, in the establishment of commissions 
and staffs for the formulation of such 
goals and objectives. Their "goals" ap-
pear to be generated by one of the fol· 
lowing methodologies: 
1. The generation of a framework 
of national needs, and the exam-
ination of each independent of 
all others. 
2. The projection of past trends as 
future goals. 
3. The assessment of available tech-
nology applicable to current soc-
ial trends. 
The first methodology was applied 
by the Commission on National Goals, 
created by President Eisenhower in 1960. 
This comm1ss1on established fifteen 
"areas of concern," which equated to 
goals. In 1961, a sixteenth concern, 
space was added to the list. These were: 
1. Agriculture 
2. Area Redevelopment 




7. International Aid 
8. Manpower Retraining 
9. National Defense 
10. Natural Resources 
11. Private Plant & 
Equipment 
12. Research & Development 
13. Social Welfare 
14. Transportation 
15. Urban Development 
16. Space 
(NGRS, 1970), 
These "goals" were not specific. The 
National Planning Association undertook 
the preparation of standards for each area 
of concern and in 19 6 5 published the ex-
pected cost of meeting these standards 
during the 19 7 0 's. This undertaking suf-
fered from a focus on immediate prob-
lems. As usually happens when emphasis 
is placed upon immediacy, by the time a 
response is applied the problem has either 
disappeared or, more likely, has escalated 
beyond the bounds of the solution. The 
notable exception was the space after-
thought, which, in fact, became a highly 
specific national objective: to reach the 
moon. The accomplishment of the lunar 
landing in 19 6 9 was due in no small part 
to its precise specification. All of these 
goals or concerns, however, suffer from a 
lack of clearly described relationships to 
each other. 
Typical of the second approach, that 
of future projection based on past trends, 
is the work of Lederman and Windus 
(1971, p. 3-4 ). They examined federal 
budget trends in 12 "functional fields" 
largely encompassed by the 16 "areas of 
concern" previously mentioned. They 
projected these trends as the government 
programs of the future. Unfortunately, 
this approach may most closely fit the 
workings of the real world. As Lecht 
observes (196 9, p. iii), 
There is, first, the probability that, 
as individuals and as a nation, we will 
continue to spend money tomorrow 
for the same or similar purposes as 
we do today and did yesterday. Fur-
thermore, for a considerable portion 
of additional resources, the alloca· 
tion appears predetermined with a 
high degree of probability. Actually 
we have a scale of allocations, fr.om 
those that can be predicted with 
great probability to that relatively 
small portion that are truly discre-
tionary. (Ibid, p .. 5). 
Lecht calls this the concept of pre-emp-
ted goals. 
The Third approach, the assessment 
of available technology, is typified by the 
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output of the National Goals Research 
Staff. This group was established as a 
staff within the White House by President 
Nixon in 19 6 9. Its functions were: 
.forecasting future developments 
and assessing the longer range con· 
sequences of present social trends ••• 
measuring the probable future im-
pact of alternative courses of action, 
including measuring the degree to 
which change in one area would be 
likely to affect another •• . estimating 
the actual range of social choice -
that is, what alternative sets of goals 
might be attainable, in light of the 
availability of resources and possible 
rates of progress. •. developing and 
monitoring social indicators that can 
reflect the present and future quality 
of American life, and the direction 
and rate of its change ••. summarii· 
ing, integrating, and correlating the 
results of related research activities 
being carried on within the various 
Federal agencies and by State and 
local governments and private organ-
izations. (NGRS, 1970, p. 174). 
The NGRS 197 0 report to the Presi-
dent contains a compendium of trends 
and projections, a summary of concerns 
in seven major social areas, and offers a 
"shopping bag" of alternative choices of 
action. The selection of options by the 
recipient of the report presumably would 
generate goals; specific objectives were 
not addressed. Nevertheless, the work of 
the National Goals Research Staff pro-
vides a valuable insight into the current 
problems of society in the United States. 
In summary then, attempts to gener-
ate national goals since 19 6 0 have been 
generally based upon one of the three 
methodologies previously mentioned, 
each typified by a given study. The first 
method, the independent examination of 
each national goal, has several shortcom· 
ings. First, it has a tendency to focus on 
immediate problems, thereby generating 
independent objectives; seconq it lacks an 
integrative long-range approach to a 
broader goal. While the second approach 
dooms our future to the political expen-
diencies of the past, the third generates a 
"goal" whenever an economically feasible 
technical reality can be matched to an 
identified social inadequacy. 
Leonard Lecht's criticism of past at.-
tempts to establish national goals is high-
ly applicable to these three techniques, 
including his own: 
The activities described as the pursuit 
of national goals typically represents 
activities we select piece-meal as 
pragmatic responses to specific indi-
vidual and national problems, activi-
ties we sometimes blunder into, ra-
ther than constituting programs con-
sciously selected because they contri-
bute to our society's goals. (Lecht, 
1969, p. 4-5). 
He concludes that: 
In the absence of a framework of in-
formation about the costs, benefits, 
manpower needs, and side effects of 
individual programs, which relates 
them to the overall objectives they 
may further or frustrate the choices 
implemented often create unanticipa-
ted problems that cancel out the an-
ticipated benefits, or they reflect the 
options of narrowly based pressure 
groups and special interests. 
A SYSTEMS MODEL FOR 
TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION 
IN SUPPORT OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Concurrent with the efforts to create 
national goals and objectives described in 
Section III have been separate and unrela· 
ted attempts to foster the utilization of 
technology developed for public sector 
programs in private sector applications. 
This was a specific mandate to the 
National Aeronautics and Space Admin· 
istration in the very act which created it. 
In 19 6 3, NASA had $ 2 .5 million allotted 
for just this task. In 196 2, implementing 
a recommendation of the White House 
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Panel on Civilian Technology, the post of 
Assistant Secretary for Science and Tech· 
nology was created in the Commerce 
Department to "encourage rapid diffu· 
sion of new technology" and to stimu-
late its industrial utilization. (Allison, 
Dec. 19 6 3, p. 2 6) While these initial 
formal efforts were not distinctly suc-
cessful (probably due as much as any· 
thing to the difficulty of measuring 
"success"), the recognition of the re-
source value of our public stockpile of 
technology caused a gradual increase 
in the scope of the transfer effort, 
notably in the Department of Defense. 
However, the rate of technology 
transfer for use in the competitive 
market,..place has increased. Without 
national goals and firm future objec-
tives for guidance in technology utili· 
zation we will remain in Stage II. 
Countel°"'productive forces will remain 
at work, one to increase the utilization 
rate of technology and the other to pre-
vent a technological "rampage through 
society." 
Until we identify clearly and cred· 
ibly national goals, specify succinctly 
objectives, and establish policies which 
encourage the coordinated utilization of 
technology in their achievement. Alvin 
Toffler's description of a society in the 
throes of accelerating technological 
change is portentious: 
Acceleration produces a faster turn-
over of goals, a greater transience of 
purpose. Diversity or fragmentation 
leads to a relentless multiplication 
of goals. Caught in this churning, 
goal-cluttered environment, we stag-
ger, future shocked, from crisis to 
crisis, pursuing a welter of conflic-
ting and self-cancelling purposes. 
(Toffler, 1970, p •. 471). 
To achieve maximum efficiency in the 
employment of technology for the public 
good is to achieve congruence between 
the goals of innovators, the users of tech· 
nology, and those of the body politic. 
The author believes the possible seeds of 
Stage III may be contained in H.R.1O2 3 O, 
a bill proposed by 25 members of the 
House of Representatives. While this bill 
purports to "establish a science and tech· 
nology policy for the United States," it 
goes further in its implementation: 
1. The Federal Government should 
maintain central policy planning 
elements in the executive branch 
which assist Federal agencies in 
(a) identifying public problems 
and objectives (b) mobilizing 
scientific and technological re-
sources for essential national 
programs ... (H. R. 10230, 
p. 21 ). 
This sounds helpful. Presumably, 
goals are to be established in their own 
absolute right, not just based upon the 
probability of being achieved with an ex· 
isting technology. 
The bill proposes an "Office of 
Science and Technology," while it could 
more effectively offer an integration of 
the technology function with the objec-
tive-setting one. The author envisions an 
"Office of National Objectives and Tech· 
nology Utilization," operating under the 
more broadly defined national goals gen· 
erated by the executive and legislative 
branches of the Federal Government. 
The operation of such an office 
would be as the control agent in this sim· 




























Figure 1. Functions of an "Office of National Objectives and Technology Utilization" 
The proposed office would operate under the defined goals of the executive and 
legislative branches of the federal government. The office would assist in measuring 
and controlling achievement of objectives. 
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Such a system would contain objec-
tives, a means of measurement of their 
achievement, and a method of control 
over the achievement process. Where ex• 
isting technology could assist in achiev· 
ing objectives, industrial effort in this 
direction should be encouraged. 'This 
could best be done by recognizing and 
utilizing the self-interest motivations of 
the private sector, such as by providing 
tax breaks for recognized goal-directed 
technology utilization. 
Where no technology exists to 
achieve a national objective, research and 
development requirements should be 
identified and federally funded. However, 
it should be recognized that the applica· 
tion of existing technology can be more 
efficient. 'Therefore, an effective infor-
mation search system should be utilized 
prior to undertaking new research and 
development, to determine what relevant 
technology has already been developed; 
then, an aggressive technology transfer 
program should be encouraged. 
The need for an integrated policy 
and technology body was recognized by 
the National Goals Research Committee: 
As of now, no Government or other 
agency has the authority to appraise 
our national needs, determine an ap-
propriately balanced national scien• 
tific program, and make the case for 
its support before the public, Con• 
gress, and the White House. Nor is 
there any agency with responsibili· 
ties, capability, and authority to 
order the internal and external prior· 
ities of science, to choose from 
among the rich selection of options 
new before the Nation, or. to attempt 
to balance the future supply of scien· 
tists with anticipated demands. 
{NGRS, 1970). 
Hopefully, Stage III is not too far 
off. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing discussion, it is 
concluded that: 
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1. We have evolved from a society 
hopefully seeking ways to utilize 
new technology into one wary 
of negative technological side-
effects. 
2. A higher stage can be achieved 
wherein technology can most 
compatibly be enlisted in sup-
port of social aims. 
3. Prerequisite to this stage are: 
a. The establishment of nation· 
al goals and objectives. 
b. The recognition and exploi· 
tation of the motivations of 
private enterprise to pursue 
technology in support of 
these objectives. 
c. The development of a means 
of measurement of their 
achievement. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper postulates that an under• 
lying cause of present energy and pollu-
tion problems is the tendency for the 
total costs of social actions to be hidden 
in the tax structure and in the degrada· 
tion of the public environment. The re-
lationship between social goals, econo-
mics, and technology is explored, and a 
scenario which illustrates the effects of 
hidden costs is described. 'The conclu-
sion reached is that exposure of full costs 
will bring economic forces to bear toward 
a technological solution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Man is the center of the Universe. 
He was given dominion over the Earth. 
But he was not given an unlimited boun-
ty; rather, he was placed in stewardship 
over a limited ecosystem lost in the cog.. 
mos. Only recently has the significance 
of this responsibility become apparent 
to him. The blue sky, the clear waters, 
the "boundless" resources are beginning 
to run short. 
Man's commitment to progress, par-
ticularly in the United States, has been 
reflected in a goal of maximizing the phy-
sical product. He has pursued this goal 
relentlessly. The Gross National Product 
under man's stewardship has blossomed, 
but he has paid a price The question is 
has the result been worth the price? This 
involves answering the questions: 
a. Has he attained what he wish-
ed to attain? 
b. Could he attain the same goal 
more effectively? 
c. What did attainment of this 
goal really cost? 
The purpose of this paper is to ex-
plore how these questions might be pur-
sued. It is considered that the answers 
lie in the definition of a set of social 
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goals, in properly-directed technology 
and in a thorough economical treatment 
of the costs. 
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY 
AND ECONOMICS 
Technology and economics have 
been blamed by a large portion of the 
public for the dilemma in which it finds 
itself. 'Hardin states, "The overall evi· 
dence seems clear. The chief reason for 
the environmental crisis is the sweep-
ing transformation of productive tech· 
nology since World War II. Productive 
technologies with intense impacts on the 
environment have displaced less destruc-
tive products." (Hardin, 19 7 2, p. 177) 
Steward Udall says, "In post-war Amer-
ica technology was holy writ. No prob-
lem was so complex that it couldn't be 
solved through more ingenious technol· 
ogy." (19 7 4, p. 2 3) Even Drucker looks 
to a new generation which differentiates 
between economic values and human 
values • (19 71, p. 7 0) The author main· 
tains that neither economics nor tech· 
nology is the principle cause of the dil· 
emma; rather, it is the direction in which 
they have been aimed or allowed to de-
velop that is the cause. Specific goals 
must be established before economics 
or technology can be used as tools to 
achieve such goals. 
Today, any ten people polled on 
what direction they think that the 
United States should be headed, would 
likely define ten different goals ranging 
from a position of material superiority 
to a unified world government. Even 
the presidents of the United States had 
widely divergent views. S(:Veral aided 
in the draft of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence which saw the government as 
the guardian of the individual, " ••• to 
ensure these rights, governments have 
been instituted among men." John F. 
Kennedy placed the emphasis on society, 
"Ask not what your country can do for 
you, but rather, what can you do for 
your country." 
• 
Dasman contends that: 
It is not surprising then that those 
areas of conservation (technology) 
which produce a profit are readily re-
ceived whereas those that cost mon-
ey without compensatory income lag 
far behind. (1968, p. 152) 
One needs to define what constitutes 
"compensatory income" to evaluate the 
validity of Dasman's assertion. Obvious-
ly technology does not progress without 
a goal toward which progress can be mea-
sured. If misdirected it can create mon-
sters, but properly channeled toward a 
desired goal, technology will define a set 
of optimal actions for attaining a goal. 
Omar Khayyam asked once "What? 
Without asking, hither hurried whence? 
And without asking, · wither hurried 
hence?" (Khayyam, 19 4 2, p. 2 9 ) 
Galbraith succintly summarized the situa-
tion: 
One of the amiable idiosyncrosies 
of man is his ability to expend a 
great deal of effort without much in-
quiry as to why ... Still, it.might be 
useful on occasion, to ask about the 
goals of any costly effort, and such, I 
am persuaded is the case with econo-
mic development. Development im-
plies movement toward some result. 
What should be that result? There is 
always the danger that in the absence 
of such specification, we will tri-
umphly achieve some unwanted 
end." (Galbraith, 1971) 
Analysis of Alternatives 
In addition to specifying the desired 
goal, we also determine how that goal is 
to be achieved. It is maintained that this 
cannot be effectively done unless the true 
costs of the available alternatives can be 
examined. One would expect that the 
cost of an item is reflected by the price 
that one must pay in the market place. 
However, portions of the cost which are 
passed indirectly to society become hid-
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den, or in the words of the economists, 
"externalized." The cost of pollution is 
a current example. Garvey estimates 
that the costs connected with air pollu-
tion only run to billions of dollars per 
year. (19 7 2, p. 8 6 ) These costs must 
be "internalized" if alternatives are to 
be compared. Initially, all costs were 
external. If Adam wanted an apple, he 
had only to pluck it from the tree. 
Free? Hardly, but the costs weren't im-
mediately evident when he made his 
decision. Gradually, material and labor 
costs became internalized. Then more in-
direct costs, such as education of the 
work force, costs of industrial accidents, 
and employee health and well-being, were 
added to the product cost. 
Cost may be defined as what one 
gives up for the sake of a particular 
course of action. Expenditures for clean 
air and water and the depletion of irre- · 
placeable natural resources are a logical 
extension of this definition. When total 
price becomes apparent, the law of sup-
ply and demand will bring a balanced 
consumption. As matters now exist, the 
total price is hidden, and the lower mar-
ket price causes consumption which is 
economically out of proportion. (See 
Figure 1) 
A Tragedy on the Commons 
Consider the scenario that Hardin 
describes as a "Tragedy on the Com-
mons." (19 7 2, p. 2 5 4) The tragedy de-
velops in this way. Picture a pasture 
open to all. Each herdsman tries to keep 
as many cattle as possible on this Com-
mons. As with any scarce resource, there 
comes a point of diminishing returns, a 
point where an additional cow on the 
Commons provides an overall negative 
marginal value. The individual herdsman, 
however, receives the full gain from an 
additional cow when the loss is spread 
over all of the herdsmen. Therefore, the 
only sensible thing to do is to add as 
many cows as he can. This conclusion is 
reached by every rational herdsman in 
in the group. And therein lies the trag-






actual cost of one more unit 
perceived cost of one more unit 
CONSUMPTION 
Figure 1. The Difference Between Perceived and Real Cost 
Were full costs known, the market would consume Q leading to efficient operation on the 
production function. However, under the influence of the perceived price, the market con-
sume Q at a much higher marginal (and total) cost. (Source: Nicholson, 1972, p. 220) 
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which compels him to increase his herd 
without limit in a world that is limited. 
To continue the analogy beyond where 
Hardin left off, consider that some per-
ceptive herdsman perceives the Common 
decline and reasons with his fellow herds-
man that they should band together and 
maintain the Commons, and use a per· 
animal tax to apportion the expense. The 
total cost system acts to bring economic 
balance back to the Commons. 
Now let time pass. The pasture taxes 
become intermingled with sales taxes, in· 
come taxes, etc., and cease to be recog-
nized as a reflection of the cost of main· 
taining the Commons. Even though the 
same high cost of an additional cow is 
extracted from the herdsman, the herds-
man does not realize the connection. 
Thus, the perceived cost of adding an· 
other cow to the Commons makes the 
addition of that extra cow appear as 
economically sound. Taxes increase, the 
herdsman's income decreases; however, 
in his mind it is not due to the addition 
of that extra cow, but rather to the cost 
of "big government/' 
To maintain his income, the herds-
man increases the price of beef to the 
public. The dollar average utility of beef 
to the citizenry declines and less beef is 
consumed, threatening the beef industry. 
Continued expansion is viewed as a neces-
sary good by the community; therefore, 
the government subsidizes the beef indus-
try. Higher taxes ensue, but the "price" 
of beef declines and consumption increa· 
ses. 
The beef industry grows; there are 
more cows on the Commons. Moreover, 
there is a limit to what correction can be 
made to the abuse of overgrazing. The 
Commons has truly started to deteriorate. 
The ground is worn bare, and an "energy" 
shortage develops. Cow dung is every· 
·where, polluting the environment. Each 
person acts to maximize his own utility 
and in so doing actually diminishes it. 
The taxes are considerable but at least 
food is cheap. 
The irony of the above scenario is 
not that somebody is making an extra-
ordinary profit at the expense of some-
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one else, but rather that everybody is 
suffering due to inefficient operation of 
the Commons. The herdsman wastes his 
resources, and the resultant waste pro-
ducts pollute his environment. 
WASTE 
If the situation described above 
seems far fetched, consider the case of 
the American automobile. It is one of 
the most inefficient machines imagin" 
able, particularly when operated with 
the national average of 1.3 people per 
carload. In response to what was con· 
sidered to be a rational cost/demand 
tradeoff, industry turned to the pro-
duction of smaller wars. Yet the public 
didn't buy them. Why? Because the 
true cost was hidden. The price of 
gasoline was obscured by price controls· 
and industry subsidies in the form of 
depletion allowances, etc. The costs 
of more streets and parking, and increa· 
sed pollution are similarly hidden, or at 
least allowed to accumulate in a degra· 
ded environment. 
In 19 7 0, the United States used the 
equivalent of over 29.7 million barrels of 
oil per day. Only 5 0 per cent of this was 
purposely utilized. The other half was 
wasted due to inefficiencies of utilization 
and transmission. By 1980, the consump-
tion of energy is expected to increase by 
4 5 per cent, but the overall efficiency of 
utilization is expected to fall to only 4 6 
per cent. {Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, 19 7 3, p.11) (See Figures 2 and 3.) 
Electricity furnishes only 3 5 per cent 
of the energy used in its generation. 
Garvey estimates that the total efficiency 
of electrical power, from the coal mine to 
the baking of a cake is in the order of 14 
per cent. (19 7 2, p. 52) As Rodgers 
points out, the true cost of electricity is 
hidden by such measures as New York's 8 
billion dollar subsidy program to the 
electrical power generating industry. 
(19 7 2, p. 2·4 5 ) Moreover, these wastes 
and inefficiencies are a major part of the 
pollution problem. Estimates of energy. 
associated environmental damages run to 
tens of billions of dollars per year; for 
the most part, they are externalized costs.. 
As seen in the case of the Commons, the 
costs of wastes are passed to all of us, but 
because they are not readily apparent, the 
laws of economics cannot function to 
keep balance in the market place; conse-
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ciency. Admittedly, some waste is inevia 
table. 'The second law of thermodyna-
mics will not be stayed by wishful think-
ing or even technology. Still, a large part 









Figure 2o Useful Output in Relation to Total Energy Consumed 
The figure shows that "waste", the difference between total energy consumed and 
useful output, will continue to increase in the future. Source: Joint Committee on 













(UNITS' lllLLION BBLS/OAY OIL EQUIVALENT) 
Figure 3. Use and Allocation of Different Forms of Energy in 1970. 
The figure shows that lost energy is almost as large as used energy ( 14. 7% and 15.0% 
respectively). Electrical energy generation and transportation are the two largest com-
ponents of lost energy. Source: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1972, foldout 
"C"). 
INTEGRATING THE MEANS 
AND THE ENDS 
One acute observer saw to the heart 
of the problem. uwe have met the enemy 
and he is us", observed Pogo. As tools of 
man's purpose, technology and econo-
mics can only follow as directed. If direcQ 
ted to maximize monitary profits, econo-
mics will lead to this goal. If directed to 
maximize human utility (and this utility 
, is defined), given the scent, economics 
will lead the way. Similarly, when we 
wanted to walk on the moon, technology 
took us there. Should we direct technol-
ogy to the task of reducing waste and in-
creasing ·efficiency, such goals can be ac-
complished. For example, such processes 
as magnetohydrodynamic power genera-
tion systems can increase efficiencies up 
to 60 per cent. Use of ultra-high voltage 
transmission lines and D. C. power tran~ 
mission can significantly reduce transmis-
sion losses. (Rodgers 1972, p. 256) 
But the full costs of power genera-
tion must be determined so that the eco-
nomics of such technology can be evalua-
ted. Growth, both in terms of population 
and standard of living is going to require 
more energy, and, as previously pointed 
out, the more energy that is used, the 
more is wasted. An increase of 59 per 
cent in efficiency would allow a 50 per 
cent increase in energy available with· 
out any increase in total consumption. 
Technology can widen the range of 
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society's options as well. The leverage of 
technology can permit increasing efficien-
cies and greater capabilities. To the ex-
tent that it is necessary to expend addi· 
tional energy resources on technology in 
order to develop new power sources and 
more efficient processes, total conserva· 
tion may be counterproductive. Again, 
examination of full costs permits a valid 
and efficient evaluation of the alterna· 
tives. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the conclusion of this paper that 
lack of proper direction for economics 
and technology has been the cause of our 
current dilemma in the area of pollution 
and energy. This has been brought on, in 
part, by a system of disguised costs which 
has made the "worst appear the better 
cause." 'The pressures of today's realities 
are forcing the selection of an end goal; 
however, for us to make a valid evalua-
tion of alternatives to reach this goal, full 
costs must be made visible and be re-
flected in the market. The most viable 
way to accomplish internalization of 
these costs is to eliminate a tax structure 
which shields actual costs from scrutiny 
and to require that industry absorb the 
cost of damage to the ecosystem. When 
goals are established and options under· 
stood, the direction of our technological 
development can be set to attain our 
goals in the most effective manner, and at 
the least eco-cost. 
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ABSTRACT 
Technology is growing, subdividing, 
causing persistent change and appearing 
as a momentous giant, moving where it 
chooses. Public policy on science and 
technology is pluralistic and fragmented. 
Information on activity, status, and con· 
trol are vitally needed to provide for 
more effective management of current 
technology. Through methods of man· 
agement information systems reporting 
techniques, perspectives and solutions to 
the problem are highlighted in the follow· 
ing essay. 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology refers to the systematic 
application of scientific, engineering, ad· 
ministrative, and other bodies of know· 
ledge to the accomplishment of practical 
tasks and problem solving. Among other 
things, technology is used to detect ill· 
ness, harvest cotton, wage war, supervise 
and transport people, and control birth. 
From an expanding state of know· 
ledge, technology transfer extracts appli• 
cations to produce activities and com· 
modities that were previously unattain· 
able or undiscovered. As a consequence, 
the pace of technological advance induces 
fundamental and persistent change. His-
torians, such as Elting Morison (1974, 
p. 171), view the changes with some 
alarm. 
The technological systems we con-
struct move, self evidently, toward 
increasing change. Man, in the past, 
has been differentiated from all other 
creatures by a remarkable capacity to 
accommodate. He has moved, in 
large part by taking thought, from 
the cave to condominium, from the 
foot pace to the speed of sound, 
from hard labor to services supplied 
by a whole structure of invisible 
hands. A great question now is 
whether he can continue this amaz· 
ing power of accommodation in a 
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period when more and more things 
in his environment change more and 
more rapidly and when the process 
of change produces not only increa· 
sed goods and services, but environ-
mental pollution and increased con· 
fusion. At what point will he simply 
break down as fuses blow in an oVel'" 
loaded system? 
Public policy regarding technology 
must address itself to two issues - the 
destination toward which change carries 
us as well as the speed of the journey. 
The U. S. National Commission on Tech· 
nology made this conclusion with regard 
to attainment of national goals (Bowen, 
1966, p. 51): 
Ours, like most modern societies, 
is becoming 'future-oriented'. We 
realize that we have to plan ahead. 
We have to anticipate social change. 
We need to assess its consequences. 
We have to decide what policies are 
necessary to facilitate, or inhibit, 
possible changes. 
Increasingly, technology makes it 
possible for societies to 'invent the 
future'. Given the great resources 
of this country, we can decide what 
kinds of future we want and work 
for it. We can spell out our national 
goals and seek to meet them within 
the framework of our capacities. 
Technology is such an important re-
source that it must be managed carefully. 
Managers must have complete, accurate, 
and timely information to make sound 
decisions. Of course, the availability of 
information does not in itself guarantee 
intelligent use; but without information, 
a manager is at a decidedly serious dis-
advantage. 
A management information system 
is defined as any information system that 
provides a manager with information for 
a given period on the activity, current 
status, and control of the system for 
which he is responsible. The remainder of 
this paper is structured as a management 
information system, providing samples of 
the activity, status, and control of current 
technology. 
AWAKEN THE SLEEPING GIANT: AN 
ACTIVITY REPORT 
Knowledge Explosion 
Knowledge is the fuel of technology. 
If we trace the history of books and use 
this as an activity barometer of know-
ledge, the following estimates prevail. 
(Toffler, 1970, pp. 30-31) 
Prior to 1500 A.D., estimates indi-
cate that Europe was reproducing books 
at the rate of 1,000 titles per year. At 
that rate, it took a full century to pro-
duce a library of 100,000 titles. By 
1950, Europe was producing 120,000 
titles a year - what formerly took a 
century now took ten months. By 1960, 
a 15th century's work could be comple-
ted in seven and one-half months. By 
the mid-sixties, books on a world scale 
approached 1,000 titles per day. Today, 
the United States government generates 
100,000 reports each year plus 450,000 
articles, books, and papers. On a world-
wide basis, scientific and technical litera-
ture mount at a rate of 60,000,000 pages 
a year. 
There is no reason to believe that 
each new unit of literature represents a 
completely new source of knowledge. 
Researchers and practitioners are often 
found to independently make the same 
discoveries. But, even a discount for 
overlap will not take the edge from the 
fact that the frontiers of knowledge are 
being mined at a tremendous rate. 
. Furthermore, there is reason to be-
. lieve that the rate is still rising. 'The 
number of scientific journals and articles 
is doubling about every 15 years and 
according to biochemist Philip Siekevitz. 
(Ibid, p. 31): 
What has been learned in the last 
three decades about the nature of liv-
ing beings dwarfs in extent of know-
ledge any comparable period of 
scientific discovery in the history of 
mankind. 
With knowledge as the fuel of tech" 
nology, the flow of this fuel can be depic-
ted in the following chart: 





Figure 1. Knowledge Flow Cycle 
The flow of knowledge from first dis--
covery through practical application 
to obsolescence is shown. This is a 
never ending cycle where the applica· 
tion, knowledge and impact are often 




An expanding· state of knowledge 
permits the production of new commodi· 
ties and increases the types and kinds of 
services provided. Industrial growth rates 
range from 5 to 10 per cent in most in· 
dustrial nations. During the 1960 to 
1968 period, United States production 
grew at the rate of 4.5 per cent. 
A growth rate of 5 per cent implies a 
doubling of the total output of goods ap-
proximately every fifteen years. Within 
a seventy-five year lifetime, five doublings 
could take place. By the time an indivi-
dual reaches old age, the society around 
him will be producing thirty-two times as 
much as when he was born. {Ibid, p. 24) 
Stanford Research Institute studied 
the span of time between the first com-
mercial appearance of a new electrical ap-
pliance and the time manufacturing rea-
ches peak production of the item. The 
average span of time before 1920 was 
thirty-four years. Between 1939 and 
1959, the span was reduced to eight 
years. {Ibid, p. 28) Other investigators 
have shown a similar reduction in the 
time between discovery of ideas and the 
first application. 
The stepped up pace of discovery, 
exploitation and diffusion in turn accel-
erates the whole cycle still further. New 
machines and techniques are not only 
products, but a source of fresh ideas. 
These new ideas extend to every facet of 
our existence. Men on the moon, super-
sonic transports, war by remotely piloted 
vehicles, food production, energy, leisure 
time, computers, city planning, research 
and development are but a few examples 
of technology's impact. Hardly an area 
of life is left untouched by recent tech-
nology and innovation. 
Impact 
Economic research has ascribed 40 
per cent or more of the growth in indus-
trial output as a direct result of technol-
ogical progress. (Nicholson, 1972, p.216) 
Progress has blessed parts of the world 
with an unprecedented standard of Jiving 
and supply of per capita goods. And yet, 
so-called "progress" has resulted in pollu-
tion, waste and shortages of certain re-
sources. Complaints are heard that tech-
nology is bringing power to the technol-
ogically elite and that culture gap and 
future shock are setting in. 
Morison (1974, p. 172) describes 
possible impact as follows: 
Technical systems proceed toward 
generality and abstraction - num-
bers, models, print-outs, credit cards, 
experience converted to pictures, and 
so forth. The power to abstract has 
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been a principal resource for man in 
the struggle from primal mud to 
high-rise. But still much of his ex-
perience has remained literal and 
concrete - face to face, reaping 
where one sowed, building with one's 
own hands, judging by the fruits 
thereof. The question here is how 
much abstraction can man stand, 
how much removal from first causes, 
how much action at a distance, how 
much translation of personal exper-
ience into attenuating resemblances 
or symbols, before he gets beside 
himself among the shadows? 
PORTRAIT OF A GIANT: 
A STATUS REPORT 
Economic Demand for Technology 
The urge for new technology is tre-
mendous. 'A text on Economics of the 
Firm, (Thompson, 1973, p. 201) states 
that "Technical innovation and virtuos-
ity is a weapon of rivalry which pervades 
nearly every industry." 
Some firms are more financially able 
than others to engage in invention and in-
novation. Hence, they place strong em-
phasis on research and development activ-
ities and tend to be technologically pro-
gressive. 'Implicit in a firm's search for 
improved production techniques is the 
hope that successful research and devel-
opment activities will increase produc-
tive efficiency or provide new ideas; this 
in turn will give the finn a cost or mar-
keting advantage and ultimately allow for 
higher profitability. 
Managers hedge future survival and 
protect their competitive position by par-
ticipation in the stream of innovation, 
even if they are uncertain where it leads 
and cannot predict a positive payoff. Ad-
ditionally, innovation is often viewed as a 
requisite for maintaining the quality and 
and morale of technical and engineering 
staff (equating a progressive image with 
the attraction of high-calibre personnel). 
The economic picture is summarized 
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by Thompson (1973, p. 202): 
The point here is that personal-
ity and organizational considera-
ations prevailing inside the firm com-
bine with economic forces from out-
side to virtually compel an enterprise 
to participate in or even initiate ma-
jor innovation programs. 
It would be wrong to conclude that 
profit-maximizing firms provide the only 
demand for technology. Cities and na-
tions provide services such as education, 
national defense, and voting opportuni-
ties. With these services come the social, 
cultural and economic factors that influ-
ence the adoption of problem solving 
techniques and increasing technology. 
There is good reason to claim that 
the very act of identifying a problem 
kindles an innovative flame. This can be 
true on any organizational scale down to 
the individual person; some quests are 
merely better financed or more skill-
fully executed than others. 
Summary status: There is a giant 
demand for technology. 
Technology Flow Status 
The fountains of technology begin 
with research at the frontiers of current 
knowledge and experience. Explora-
tions are often directed and propelled by 
a search for solutions to specific problems 
while other research is open ended and 
undirected, free to explore knowledge for 
the sake of knowledge. 
When an idea shows promise of ap-
plication to a practical purpose it goes 
through a development process wherein 
further knowledge is gained in a leam-
by-doing situation. The combined inputs 
of research and development (R&D) build 
a potential pressure that permits technol-
ogy to flow. In fiscal year 1973, the fed· 
eral government funded seventeen billion 
dollars of R&D. While about one billion 
dollars were spent on the collection, dis-
semination and processing of documen• 
tation, only forty-three million were 
spent to stimulate the secondary uses of 
ideas and inventions. (National Academy 
of Engineering, 1974, p. 16) In addition 
to federal expenditures, universities and 
private companies contributed their inde-
pendent research and development re-
sources. 
The flow of technology is represen• 
ted by the chart in Figure 2. Some o,f the 
new ideas flow freely toward useful appli-
cations and result in goods and services 
available to mankind. Yet, criticisms 
have been leveled at each of the three 
main features of technology flow: inputs; 
outputs, and flow channels. The R&D 
inputs have been criticized, at various 
times, as being too small, too large, or 
misdirected. At this point, we have little 
in the way of standards to guide our judg-
ments. The applications of technology 
(output) seem most criticized for their 
direction or disproportionate benefits for 
the few. 
Recent interest has been mounting 
for thorough analysis of flow channels, 
and has given rise to the concept of tech-
nology transfer.1 Investigators are intel"' 
ested in tracing the technology pipelines 
and discovering the valves, rating the ca· 
pacity, flow rate, and resistance and dis-
covering the leaks. 
A research paper by T. J. Allen 
(1966, p. 1) states that the existing chan-
nels for communications within and 
between scientific and technical commun• 
ities are not performing as well as desired. 
He notes an astounding lack of under· 
standing of the way in which the channels 
actually function. 
The flow of technology, as measured 
by adoption by firms and industries, dis-
plays a wide variety of rates. Some inno-
vations languish in oblivion for long 
periods and then are adopted rapidly, 
1 Technology transfer is defined as ("a purposive, conscious effort to move technical 
devices, materials, methods, and/or information from the point of discovery or devel-
opment to new users." (Creighton, 1972, p. 2) 
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others never mount a serious challenge to 
displace current operations, and still 
others come quickly into general use. 
One assessment of the dormant class 
of ideas is given by the head of Product 
Development Consultant. (Rockett, July 
1967, p. 33) 
Nobody knows for sure how many 
good technical ideas lie fallow for 
RESEARCH 
every one that is a commercial suC? 
cess. The real number is unimpor-
tan t. What counts is that mechan-
isms be found to bring a return on 
investment represented by this vast 
wasteland of technology ... Selling 
these dormant ideas, or buying some 
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Figure 2. Technology Flow Chart 
The technology flow has as its input research discoveries and development adaption 
of technological concepts and ideas. This generates a storehouse of R&D technology 
that flows to several sectors. The ultimate good of the R&D effort is new and ex-




Widespread attention is being focus-
ed on technology diffusion, information 
dissemination, and knowledge linkers. 2 
The research and experiences in these 
areas, just as with other technologies, 
bring promise of better flow for technol-
ogy in general. Effective technology 
transfer could become at once both a re-
lief for technological constipation and a 
network for integrating and directing 
technology toward purposive ends. 
A Giant Under the Microscope 
The broader and deeper society's 
technical capability, the greater is the 
technological imperative to subdivide ac-
tivity so that the full contribution of each 
specialized bit of knowledge can be gain· 
ed. Thus, a technology explosion starts 
with a single problem. The problem is 
studied and found to have structure. The 
structure may be divided and each part 
provides a new subject for study. This 
subdivision process is like a tree diagram 
describing some ith problem in the world 
(see Figure 3). Notice that there is a geo-
metric rate of expansion and that many 
other problems will be treated similarly. 
The branches of one problem tree may 
graft with branches of another problem 
tree. The overall result is an interdepen· 
dent maze of combinational relationships 
that boggles the mind. This infinite frag-
mentation process makes it very difficult 
to track technology or to bound its con-
sequences. 
The complexity and pace of our 
giant seem to cleave the world into two 
parts: a community that understands 
science, copes with complexity and likes 
a fast and changing pace; another that is 
perplexed by science, prefers a relaxed 
pace and enjoys simplicity. 
The former community is small in 
proportion to the latter but has a tremen· 
dous base for power; furthermore, the 
scientific community may appear elite to 
the other community and has a constant 
demand for higher skilled manpower to 
work on the growing branches of prob-
lem trees. This division provides the 
scenario for cultural lag and future 
shock. 
With each increment of efficiency in 
technology transfer there is an accelera-
ted pace for change in our world. As the 
giant picks up speed, it also becomes in· 
creasingly important that we know its dir· 
ection. It appears that society has some-
thing big by the tail. What will be done 
with it? The immediate inclination is to 
ask the person in charge. 
Who is in Charge? 
The United States has no focal point 
of authority for science and technology. 
In the book Brain Bank of America 
(1975, p. 14), Boffey expresses: 
It has long been acknowledged that 
the United States has no single sci-
ence policy and no central scientific 
institution. Rather, it.has a pluralistic 
system in which science policy is set 
by a multitude of public bodies and 
private organizations that operate on 
different levels and pursue different 
ends. 
It is evident from both the activity 
and status reports that the technology 
system needs some managing influence. 
Hence, proceed directly to the control 
report. 
2Technology diffusion refers to the historic unplanned movement of information from 
one user to another without a focused effort for active transfer; information dissemin• 
ation implies a planned effort. Knowledge linkers are individuals who operate within 
an organization and provide the mechanism which couples the source of knowledge 




Figure 3. Problem Tree 
Described is the subdivision process which occurs as each aspect of a problem is focus-
ed on, resulting in a geometric rate of expansion. The branches of one problem tree 
may graft with the branches of another tree in an interconnected maze.. This infinite 
fragmentation makes it very difficult to track technology or bound its consequences. 
DOMESTICATING THE GIANT: 
A CONTROL REPORT 
Basis for Control 
A complete control report cannot be 
presented for lack of essential informa-
tion about the technology system. The 
following elements are lacking: 
1. Identification of responsibility 
centers 
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2. System objectives 
3. A budget or standards of pro-
duction for the period 
A review of the missing manage-
ment control elements in in order. For 
the scope of this report, only a resume of 





The establishment of leadership and 
a public policy for science and technol-
ogy, with all their various subdivisions, is 
no simple task. The persistent introdu~ 
tion of more advanced technology re-
quires an organization with mechanisms 
to handle change and to cope with un-
scheduled development and contingen-
cies. Shortcomings in a technologically 
sophisticated process are virtually intol-
erable, while correction time may be 
lengthy, expense costly, and scars on rep-
utation long in healing. While acts of God 
may be excused, people who invent the 
future will be held responsible for it. 
Many potential leaders consider the 
complex production of technology from 
the point of view of a few factors with 
which they are familiar and have skills in 
controlling. This kind of leadership push-
es those few factors to the extreme, until 
diminishing returns prove that they are 
no longer required. Then, new leadership 
and new factors come to the forefront. 
Ideal leadership would come from a 
"man for all seasons'', using balanced, 
symmetrical, holistic approaches. Placed 
at his disposal would be tools that would 
help define objectives, assess alternatives 
and deal rationally with complex techni-
cal, political, economic, and social pres-
sures that impinge on his task. 
Systems analysis may be one such 
tool. 'Intended to overcome the piece-
meal fragmentation of other more special-
ized approaches, the systems approach 
provides a language which talks of total 
embrace. Systems analysis would still re-
quire some development for use in mana-
ging technology. It is still an imprecise 
tool for dealing with the rather nonquan-
tifiable factors of public policy. For these 
situations, it has popularly been rated as 
"paralysis by analysis". (Hoos, 1972, p. 
25) 
Objective and Standards of Production 
For lack of a better starting point, 
the United States Planning-Programming-
Budgeting System has listed the following 
general goals: 
1. Identify our national goals with 
precision and on a continuing 
basis. 
2. Choose from among these goals 
the ones that are most urgent. 
3. Search for alternative means for 
reaching those goals most effe~ 
tively at least cost. 
4. Inform ourselves not merely on 
next year's costs, but on subse-
quent years' costs of our pro-
grams. 
5. Measure the performance of our 
programs to insure a dollar's 
worth of service for each dollar 
spent. 
The crucial questions are how and 
who should decide the objectives and 
standards to be used. Should we leave it 
to the scientists? Where would their inter-
ests take us? Could we leave it to the lay-
men? How well do they understand the 
problems? Morison (1974, p. 171) asks a 
similar question: 
How can the jobs, the machines and 
the technical systems be designed to 
fit not so much the claims of produc-
tion as the requirements of human 
beings? 
He then proposes a method with 
which we have some familiarity. 
The concern for the particular case 
in the creation of the common law 
was equalled by the interest to pro-
ceed through a series of cases toward 
generality. Accumulating decisions, 
given increasing shape by the force of 
precedent, becomes a sort of control-
ling synthesis, an accepted regulation 
for recurring human actions that 
were similar, if not in detai~ in kind. 
Ibid, p. 177) 
This process is meant to be sensitive 
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to every person's claim and yet provide 
some continuity and consistency for esta-
blishing norms. Briefly, the steps would 
proceed as follows: 
1. Designate a selected technical 
problem. 
2. Select a small group of engi-
neers, scientists, government of-
ficials and wisemen to formulate 
a case (a file of trial briefs). 
3. Conduct a hearing where all in-
terested parties have a claim to 
be heard. 
4. Formulate a final case with pro-
posed alternatives supported by 
full explanations. 
5. Place the issue before the people 
of the jurisdiction involved at 
voting time. 
Such exercises, repeated at various 
places, would, in time, produce a consid-
erable body of informed opinion that 
could be collected and codified as general 
principles governing the applications of 
science and technology. 
Morison's proposed process of com-
mon technology, if it could be kept fluid, 
has a structure which includes goal direc-
tion, balance, symmetry, and integration 
- all of the elements which are so badly 
needed for domesticating the fragmented 
technological giant. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The management information sys-
tems approach, which consists of the 
activity, status, and control reports, 
is a useful method for problem expo-
sition. 
2. Technology has a vast capability for 
solving problems, but its fast pace 
and explosive fragmentation give it 
giant proportion and make it diffi-
cult to manage. 
3. Technology transfer mechanisms pro-
vide a network that can bind the sys-
tem together as well as provide for an 
efficient flow of technology. 
4. Current public policy for science and 
technology is fragmented and devoid 
of effective responsibility centers and 
national objectives. 
5. Systems analysis, common technol-
ogy, or other balanced and holistic 
approaches should be developed to 
help integrate and guide our technol-
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ABSTRACT 
The complexity of national and in· 
ternational facets of technology transfer 
- including military security, impact on 
world markets and economics, ideologi· 
cal image, and resultant human and social 
impacts - are discussed with a view to-
ward public formulation. The transfer of 
technology related to development of 
productive capacity and computers with-
in the People's Republic of China, and 
the paucity of factual information, devel· 
oping trends, and future studies of tech-
nology transfer in the USSR are used to 
illustrate the relationships of these facets. 
The implicit exhortation of this survey is 
that in all policy formulation procedures 
consideration of all facets be assumed, 
particularly those relating to human and 
social impacts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Charles E. Hutchinson of the U.S. 
Air Force Office of Scientific Research 
quotes Gabriel Almond as contending 
that "The United States and the West 
must either lead in the process of mod-
ernizing the underdeveloped areas, or by 
default, contribute to a kind of world in 
which our institutions and values cannot 
survive." (Hutchison, 1966, p. iv.) 
From 1950 through 1964, the 
United States enjoyed the dominant posi-
tion as the Free World's supplier of mili-
tary equipment. Today, this position is 
being challenged by nations (allied to the 
United States) whose emerging status is 
making review of U.S. methods and poli-
cies imperative. (Catledge, 1969, p. 179.) 
Our world market position is clearly be-
ing challenged. 
Dr. Hans Mark, director of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration's Ames Research Center, is quoted 
by Richard O'Lone as having testified to 
a Senate subcommittee that, "A real loss 
in the capability of the U.S. to produce 
new technology for its own exploitation 
or for sale abroad as a product could be a 
major blow to our economic strength." 
(O'Lone, 1973, p. 83.) This raises the 
32 
question of whether U.S. policy on 
"control of high-technology exports" to 
the USSR, China, and other communist 
nations should be made less rigid, and 
for what quid pro quo's? (Wolf, 1974, 
p. 5.) 
The foregoing concerns echo: 
••• the thinking of a generation of 
American leaders who have invested 
substantial resources and other 
efforts to improve the conditions 
of life in deficit areas in the hope 
that economic advance would con-
tribute to political stabilization and 
create the soil in which democratic 
institutions might take root 
(Hutchinson, 1966, p. iv.) 
The decade since Hutchinson's ex-
pression of concern has but elaborated 
the dilemma of technology transfer and 
its complex ramifications. Many promi-
nent Americans are still endeavoring to 
understand and reach an optimum solu-
tion for such complex problems as the 
world welfare and developing countries, 
maintenance of world image by technol-
ogy transfer, protection of the U.S. 'share 
of the world markets, maintenance of the 
long run balance of payments, and na-
tional security protection. A most sensi· 
tive facet of these considerations remains 
the determination of propitious policies 
directed toward technology transfer with 
communist bloc nations. 
OBJECTIVES 
The principal objectives of this trea-
tise shall encompass elucidation of signif· 
icant facets of technology transfer with 
the major communist bloc nations - the 
USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic) and the PRC (People's Republic of 
China), selected interrelated facets of 
technology transfer with and among 
other nations, and a description of some 
effects of our national policy in these 
matters. This presentation is not inten-
ded to be the springboard of a new and 
drastic revision of public policy or opin· 
ion, but rather an illumination of the 
complex interrelationships of technology 
development and deliberate transfer, eco-





The transfer of technology is 
usually thought of as an imitative 
process. An underdeveloped nation 
imports the techniques and tools of 
more industrially advanced countries; 
or, within a developed nation, one 
sector of the economy simply adopts 
a manufacturing process found useful 
in another; or, within an industry, a 
firm copies the products and meth· 
ods of its competitors. These would 
seem to be simple cases of imitation, 
were it not that imitation itself is a 
most complex matter. 
If we are to understand the 
process of technological diffusion, 
we must regard technology as a cul· 
tural, social psychological, and politi-
cal process as well as the imitation of 
artifacts. (Kranzberg, 1966, pp. 
37-38.) 
In addressing the subject of technol-
ogy transfer, the human impact of inno-
vation should not be overlooked, whether 
the change be educational, sociological, 
or technological, for each induces further 
change in the others. One author con· 
tends that "All types of change are di&o 
ruptive of traditional culture patterns, 
but technological change is perhaps most 
disruptive of all." (Ibid., p. 37.) The con-
comitant need for new or higher skill 
levels places a near term demand on edu· 
cational endeavors; and what force or im· 
pact, such as education, has as long-range 
an effect upon a nation's sociological and 
even political climate? 
The impact of technological change 
can result in fear, high emotion, and near 
hysteria resulting from partial understan-
ding. Are we not individually, and as a 
nation, led toward decisions and policies 
out of these motivations? 
The sad historical fact is that 
those who have had a major voice in 
determining how technology is to be 
used in our society have not always 
been sensitive to the needs of those 
whose lives were surely going to be 
affected. (Tribus, 1971, p. 27.) 
This impact of education so under-
lies the entire spectrum of technology 
innovation and transfer as to make one 
wonder which is the driving motivator •. 
Skilled and flexible labor seem to operate 
within processes which create both the 
demand and supply for new technology. 
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Great attention has been paid to 
the development in Germany of tech· 
nical education and to the contribu-
tion that it made to German indust-
rial advancement at the end of the 
Century. Not enough attention has 
been paid to the fact that this em• 
phasis coincided with the develop-
men t of industrial processes - pri-
marily in chemicals and steel -
which would make better use of the 
engineer and scientist than of the 
craftsman and tool maker. By acci-
dent or design, Germany developed 
an educational framework that 
meshed with the process require• 
ments of the then current wave of 
industrial frontier. (Murphy, 1966, 
pp. 24-25.) 
An interrelated aspect of high 
importance is the individual's behavior-
al bent toward acceptance and promo-
tion, or rejection of innovation in any 
form. (Jolly, 1974, p. 3.) Without a po&o 
itive motivator, alternately designated as 
"linker" or gatekeeper" in literature, the 
completion of the transfer process by ac-
tual utilization is notably diminished. The 
apparent success of the People's Republic 
of China in developing "motivators" may 
well be the key to its observable growing 
success. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Heymann in "China's Approach to 
Technology Acquisition" succintly des-
cribes technology transfer from the USSR 
to the PRC. 
The People's Republic of China 
has exhibited wide swings in its r0" 
ceptivity to foreign technology in the 
course of its 25-year history, oscill<r 
ting between enthusiastic acceptance 
and determined rejection. In the 
1950's - the era of close Sino-Soviet 
cooperation - China eagerly accep-
ted what was undoubtedly the most 
comprehensive technology transfer in 
modem history. During that decade, 
the Chinese obtained from the Soviet 
Union the foundation of a modem 
industrial system. In the process, 
however, the Chinese became heavily 
dependent upon Soviet tutelage and 
were induced to adopt a Soviet mod· 
el of forced industrialization inappro-
priate to China's resource endow-
men t. Iri the late 1950's, the Chinese 
leaders began to reject this model 
and the overwhelming Soviet influ-
ence. The Great Leap Forward mar-
ked the reaffirmation of a more tr<r 
ditional Chinese nativism and self-
assertion. Foreign technology and ex-
pertise were rebuffed and a policy of 
self-reliance instituted. '(Heymann, 
1975, p. v.) 
The trends in imports of industrial 
machinery and process plants may be 
viewed as a "bellweather" of the shifts 
in PRC technology infusion policy as 
shown in Figure 1. 
The influence of Russia's contribu-
tion, which ran the gamut from scienti-
fic and technical education to project 
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design, production, budgeting, and mana-
ging, (Ibid., p. 6), was seen as a mixed 
blessing if not a potential ideological 
threat. The resulting complete rejection, 
including in 1960 the withdrawal of 
Russian "experts", two concurrent crop 
failures, inept policies, and gross misman-
agement combined to yield the cataclys-
mic shorMerm economic consequences of 
the Great Leap. A shift of priority favor-
ing agriculture, a policy of inducing wide-
spread "peasant" level innovation, and 
eventually a more permissive technology 
- import policy describe the rehabilita-
tion era. 
Heymann continues: 
By 1965, the economy had lar-
gely recovered from its earlier set-
backs and both domestic investment 
and foreign trade were again on the 
rise, only to be cut back once more 
by the turmoil and disruptions of the 
Cultural Revolution. (Ibid., p. 10.) 
The 1970 new wave of expansion, 
with the higher than before rise of both 
imports and exports, has seen also a very 
substantial growth of China's GNP. Quan-
titatively, imports in 1973 represented 
only 2.5 per cent of China's estimated 
GNP; however, qualitatively, they repre-
sent a crucial element in her economic 
development. 
A look at another major developing 
industry will serve to illustrate both an 
overall correlation with the foregoing dis-
cussion as well as an interesting shift in 
geopolitics. 
The Chinese objectives of self-
reliance, relevance, collectivism, and 
distributed competence have resulted 
in industrial policies whereby each 
geographical and economic area must 
be capable of its own R&D produc-
tion, and the computer and electron-
ics in industry is no exception. 
(Szuprowica, 1973, p. 598.) 
The policy of in-house initiative and 
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Figure 1 China's Imports of Machinery and Whole Plants, 1952-1973 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
The figure shows the increase in imports up to The Great Leap, which constituted the 
break in China-U.S.S.R. relations; there is a trend toward increased imports in the 
Post-Cultural Revolution. 
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engineering" is perhaps better illustrated 
in the computer industry than in machine 
tools and metals production. Szuprowicz 
states that, 
In the 1950's China received 
considerable Soviet assistance, and 
the first Chinese digital computer, 
the August-1, unveiled in 1958, was 
based on the then uncompleted 
Soviet URAL-1. (Ibid, p. 599.) 
They had beaten the Soviets at their 
own game. One wonders whether such 
achievements helped to precipitate the 
abrupt end to Soviet aid in 1960. 
In 1962, the Chinese with their DJS. 
21 had modelled a newer Soviet compu-
ter still under construction, and in 1964 
had begun to incorporate semiconductors 
in their computers. Second generation 
computers appeared in 1966, and soon 
were being installed in Albania, North 
Vietnam, and possibly Pakistan. (1bid, 
p. 600.) What has been the impact on 
our world presence, prestige and market? 
Consider this: 
British computer manufacturers 
enjoy the distinction of having sold 
the first western computers to China. 
A Marconi-Elliot ARCH 1000 was 
delivered in 1965, fallowed by an 
Elliot 803. !CL delivered a 1903 and 
a 1905 in 1967; both required U.S. 
approval because they contained 
U.S.-made components. Apparently 
the only purely U.S. computer in 
China is a Data General minicompu" 
ter. the NOVA 1200, obtained from 
Nippon Minicomputer Company, the 
Japanese licensee of Data General. 
(Ibid, p, 600.) 
Consider these facts together with 
Figure 2 and Table I, and the assertion 
that China's exports of computers, or as 
partly enabled by computers, are grow-
ing. What has been or may be the impact 
on the U.S. world Market? 
U.S. computer scientists who visit-
ed China in 1972 were surprised at the 
evidence of advancement of computer 
science. 
'We saw an operational third 
generation computer using integrated 
circuits, all home built. It puts them 
ahead of the Russians in this technol-
ogy; the Russians have to import 
their integrated circuits,' said Profes-
sor Thomas E. Cheatham, Jr., Direc-
tor of the Harvard Genter for Re-
search in Computer Technology. 
(Ibid, p. 598.) 
One significant factor might be term• 
ed education by exhibition. "A seemingly 
popular, but little-publicized vehicle of 
technology transfer to China is the indus-
trial fair or technological exhibition." 
(Heymann, 1975, p. 25.) The logistics 
and cost of exhibiting in China are hor· 
rendous, but nations (apparently the U.S. 
being a notable exception) reportedly 
have flocked to the more than 35 foreign 
industrial exhibitions in China since 
1971. Might a correlation with Figure 2 
and Table I be indicated? 
Yet, indications also show that while 
the PRC market may be extensive, the 
"reports from Shanghai indicate success-
ful employment of a window handle fac-
tory force of 100 women in the produc-
tion of magnetic cores, computer main· 
frames and transistors." (Szuprowicz, 
1973, p. 599.) Many other localized con• 
versions belie the "buy one and reverse 
engineer it" policy which has prevailed 
with the result that the "extensive mar• 
ket" has not materialized. Heymann con-
tends that the program that has been 
truly successful is the extolling of the vir-
tues of Chairman Mao 
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••• rnaintaining independence, keep-
ing the initiative in our own hands, 
relying on our own efforts and an 
arduous struggle, and building our 
country through diligence and frug-











Figure 2. People's Republic of China 
Trade Trends in Billions of Dollars 
1970 
The Figure depicts a trend toward a decrease in China's trade with communist 


























Table I. Chinese imports of calculators, computers and office machines, 
in thousands of dollars 
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
"Modern weapons Jed to the bloc sys-
tem of defense which represents, even 
for the senior partners in each bloc, a 
permanent erosion of their national 
independence and sovereignty." (Benn, 
1971, p. 23.) The developments of re-
sulting alliances for international securw 
ity in recent history have Jed to and 
maintained the situation of detente be-
tween the U.S. and the USSR. Nor has 
the situation of greatly reduced communw 
ication been limited and directed only 
toward the U.S. Moreover, the central 
multi-year plan policies of the USSR gov-
ernment have engendered a primary em-
phasis on internal development. Little or 
no transfer of technology into Russia has 
been permitted, except perhaps by espi· 
onage methods; export of technology has 
been tightly controlled and limited pri• 
marily to other communist nations as 
noted previously where some economic, 
political, and ideological goals were con-
currently sought. 
Political detente has not been the 
only barrier to technology transfer. Other 
prominent barriers noted by Dehaven in· 
elude: 
1. 'Political and legal barriers which 
cause very costly and extensive 
arrangements to be required pre-
ceding any arrangements for 
technology transfer. 
2. The Russian language when de-
liberately used as a communicaw 
tion deterrent. 
3. 'Deliberate cold war psychology. 
4. Wide differences in technical and 
physical standards and mechani· 
cal/electrical interface controls. 
(Dehaven, 1974, pp. 18-24.) 
The net result of the foregoing is 
that, judging by the paucity of literature 
on the subject, little of a concrete nature 
is known about technology transfer with· 
in or with the USSR. 
Wolfe points to the U.S.~Soviet 
agreement of May 1972 as the possi· 
ble opening of the door. Under this 
scientific and technical cooperative 
agreement, a joint commission was 
established under the co-chairmanship 
of H. Guyford Stever, Director of the 
National Science Foundation, and V.A. 
Kirillin, Chief of the State Commission 
for Science and Technology. The avow· 
ed purpose of this commission is to 
facilitate technology exchange and 
undertake cooperative R & D in sever· 
al fields; agreements regarding coopera-
tion in space, health, and the environ· 
ment were also made during this agree-
ment, and working groups were formed. 
(Wolfe, 1974, pp. 1-5.) The Soyu7.-
Apollo joint space flight was a promi· 
nent outflow from this cooperative 
agreement. 
Currently, the U.S. is maintaining 
the existing policy of rigid control of 
export of high-technology products and 
processes to the communist world. The 
number of controlled items has been 
reduced in recent years; however, advan-
ced computers, telecommunications 
equipment, and numerically controlled 
machine tools are still absolutely re-
stricted. This policy is enforced unilat.-
erally by the U.S., and multilaterally 
with NATO countries and Japan under 
a mandate from Congress (1949) recent.-
ly renewed. (Ibid., 1974, p. 8.) The 
spectre of potential enhancement of com-
munist military capabilities still looms as 
a major barrier to policy change. 
The Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency has initiated studies con· 
tracted by the Rand Corporation to: 
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1. Assist in formulating rationale 
for increased exchange and ex· 
port of technology to the USSR, 
Eastern Europe, and China. 
2. Investigate opportunities and 
methods for enhancing technol-
ogy transfer to the U.S. from 
the USSR. 
3. Investigate Soviet interests in 
and capability for using U.S. 
computer technology and more 
generally aerospace technology. 
4. Develop a dynamic mechanism 
to help assess the implications 
of technology transfer to and 
within the Soviet Union. 
5. Explore other facets. 
(Ibid.) 
Wolfe notes that Soviet inputs to re-
search and development have been both 
extensive and sustained, and considers 
that there may be a profound need for or 
value in a national policy which would 
encourage import of technology from the 
USSR. (Wolfe, 1974, p. 10.) Some major 
developments which the Soviets have 
made have been in the areas of construc-
tion materials, metals, plastics, mastics, 
cold weather lubricants, and construction 
techniques under permafrost conditions. 
The last is a possible transfer of technique 
which could be made from the Russian 
tundra to Alaska. (Ibid., p. 25.) 
With respect to study goal No. 4 
enumerated above, which in fact could be 
a separate study in itself, Simpson con· 
tends that: 
Such a dynamic mechanism 
would become a decision-aid tool 
that would assist national security 
planners to better resolve questions 
such as whether it is advisable to 
allow the Soviet Union to buy ad· 
vanced U.S. technology, or whether 
some basic technology, if supplied to 
them, could enhance their military or 
commercial position and place the 
U.S. at a significant disadvantage. 
(Simpson, 1975, p. 1.) 
Simpson proposes to develop this dy· 
namic model by studies and organization-
al analysis of: 
1. Selected key Soviet central oiw 
ganizations which influence the 
technological environment. 
2. 'The group of industrial minis-
tries responsible for the imple-
mentation of technology with· 
in their respective sectors. 
3. The expanding network of Soviet 
production associations. 
4. Soviet production plants. 
(Ibid., p. 16.) 
He well anticipates the challenge by not-
ing that dealing with the Soviets requires 
persistence, patience, adequate financial 
resources, and hard-headed endurance. 
Therefore, much of the more traditional 
Western technology transfer experience 
can only cautiously be applied to the 
U.S.-Soviet relationship. (1bid., p. 39.) 
SUMMARY 
This abbreviated survey of technol· 
ogy transfer with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the People's 
Republic of China serves only to elicit 
consideration of the myriad problems 
associated with related public policy. To 
preserve and protect military security, 
world markets, technological promin· 
ence, and the interests of our American 
based multi-national corporations, and 
particularly to consider human and 
social impacts, are all goals which must 
be duly integrated during the formulation 
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ABSTRACT 
We have been living in a period of 
benevolent climate. Food production has 
increased dramatically, but still has not 
kept pace with world population growth. 
This paper considers the impact of a pos-
sible change in climate on food produc-
tion. While experts do not agree on 
whether the future climate will be warm• 
er or colder, the consensus is that the cli· 
mate is changing. There is the possibility 
that any change in climate will make the 
food situation worse, with a major change 
or shift in climate causing mass starvation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
There have been many treatises writ;.. 
ten about the problems of population. No 
matter what tack they took, the authors 
almost invariably focused on the difficult 
task of feeding the masses. Providing food 
for all people is the greatest problem con-
fronting the world today. 
It is disturbing that partial solutions 
are regressive in nature, only postponing 
the inevitable confrontation between 
population and food supply. Successful 
efforts to increase food production slight-
ly result in reducing the numbers who 
starve to death. Those who live are then 
able to reproduce and, hence increase the 
total number of mouths to feed. 
To keep demography and food pro-
duction in perspective, many analysts 
make certain implicit assumptions regar· 
ding the stability of other factors, such as 
weather. 
Objective 
The objective of this paper is to tie 
the effects of climate to food production 
and hence to demography. The effects of 
both short;..range and long-range changes 




The scenario for tying together the 
inter-relationship among population, food 
production, and climate is based on the 
following syllogism: 
1. 'The population of the world is 
growing at an alarming rate. 
2. Grain is the major staple of the 
world. 
3. Grain reserves are presently dan-
gerously low. 
4. 'The world is becoming increas-
ingly dependent on the grain 
production capability of North 
America. 
5. Many people are currently starv• 
ing. 
6. Any change in climate could be 
pernicious. 
7. The weather is changing. 
8. In trying to feed its future mem• 
bers, the human race will face its 
greatest problem ever. 
The major thrust of this paper con-
cerns the impact of changing weather on 
food production. First, however, the 
feeding of the masses in an environment 




One needs only to consider world 
population growth, shown graphically in 
Figure 1, to gain appreciation for the 
magnitude of our changing situation. The 
population of the world did not reach 
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Figure 1. World Population Growth. (Source: Davis, 1963) 
The figure graphically depicts the increase in world population growth; 
projections place total world population at 7 million by the year 2000. 
there are four billion people and projec-
tions place the total citizenry of the earth 
around seven billion by the turn of the 
century. Since the earth is finite, this 
trend of increasing population will either 
have to change or confront some con-
straint. 
In setting forth his Malthusian Laws, 
Thomas R. Malthus clearly recognized as 
early as 1816 both this tendency and the 
consequent constraints in the statement 
"Population has this constant tendency 
to increase beyond the means of subsis-
tence." (1816, p. 9.) And even more poi-
gantly he stated: 
•.. population, could it be supplied 
with food, would go on with unex· 
hausted vigour; and the increase of 
one period would furnish the power 
of a greater increase the next, and 
this without any limit. (Ibid., p.11.) 
While the demographic trend was ac-
curately predicted early in the nineteenth 
century, its social implications have not 
been fully appreciated until recently. The 
population of the world is growing, but 
not evenly throughout society. Since 
1930, the nonindustrialized nations have 
been growing in population about twice 
as fast as industrialized ones. (Davis, 
1963, p. 124.) The pattern is quite clear: 
the world's poorest regions are making 
the greatest contribution to population 
growth. 
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Declining Death Rate 
Population growth is not due to an 
increase in birth rate only. It is also 
caused by a decrease in death rate. For 
many years, the world's population was 
relatively stable; births were almost coun~ 
ter-balanced by deaths. But medical 
science enabled mankind to alleviate suf~ 
fering and save lives. 
The effectiveness of modern-day 
medicine - the rapidity with which 
it can be disseminated and the eage-,... 
ness with which people accept it -
has resulted in drastic changes in 
death rates. (Paddock, 1967, p.16,) 
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The decrease has been steady since 1935 
and significant for all parts of the world. 
The dilemma facing the world today 
now comes into focus. Technology devela 
oped in the advanced countries has ena. 
bled the less developed countries to lower 
their death rates. Most people will accept 
the contribution of medical science as 
being good. However, it is a double edged 
sword: 
It is a fact that medical science is 
fostering a growth rate of population 
which the sciences of food produo-
tion have no present prospect of suS<> 
taining ••• Only extremists at pre--
sent would allow children to die in 
infancy, in order to save them from 
dying of starvation later. (Vickers, 
1974, p. 376.) 
1965 1980 
Figure 2. Death Rates of the World 
Portrayed in the figure above is the dramatic decrease in the world's death 
rate in the past 45 years, the decrease is significant for all parts of the world. 
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FOOD 
With the demographic pattern esta-
blished, we may now turn to the second 
leg of the triad: food, lhcreasing popula-
tion is not a problem per se as long as we, 
the citizens of this planet, can feed all of 
our cohabitants. 
Increased Food Production 
Technology has enabled us to in-
crease our food production capabilities 
significantlyo This increase is especially 
evident in the United States where 
• . . the efficiency of the American 
agriculture and animal industry 
(make it) possible for 4.5 per cent 
of the population to produce enough 
food for the domestic needs of the 
nation as well as an exportable sufb 
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Yields per acre have been increaser! 
four-fold as man has improved farming 
techniques, developed new seeds, con-
trolled disease and insects, and built big.. 
ger and more efficient harvesting and 
processing machinery. 
Decreased Reserves 
In spite of these great strides, how-
ever, we are still losing ground, lri 1971, 
world grain production reached an all 
time high. The United States has put into 
production all its cropland which had 
been held in reserve. Yet grain reserves 
have declined steadily until there is now 
only a 26-day supply. This deteriorating 
situation is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Since plants represent 90 per cent 
of all human caloric intake, grain reserves 
are a good indicator of the world's food 
situation. Two very disturbing facts have 
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Figure 3. World's Grain Reserves 
The figure portrays the decrease in the world's grain reserves 
since 1972 along with an increase in North American exports. 
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1. In spite of great increases in pro--
duction in North America, reser· 
ves have fallen dangerously low. 
2. The world is becoming increas-
ingly dependent on North Amer-
ica for food. North America is 
essentially the only net expor-
ting region in the world. These 
exports, representing approxima· 
tely 10 per cent of all food con· 
sumed, make it quite appropri· 
ate to refer to this region as the 
Saudi Arabia of food. 
(Scrimshaw, 1974, p. 19.) 
Population v. Food 
Clearly, the race is on between popu· 
lation growth and food production. Pi:o--
duction gains have been impressive, but 
when normalized to a per-capita basis 
these gains vanish. As Georg Borgstrom 
discouragingly concluded: 
food production, both agriculture 
and fishery, has barely managed to 
keep abreast of the growth in human 
numbers. Despite ''green revolutions" 
and hugh investments in irrigation 
dams and fertilizer plants, no clear 
upward trend can be registered ••• 
To get ahead of the rising popula-
tion tide, a doubling of the output 
would be needed. Only when this has 
been achieved can we honestly talk 
about banishing hunger or winning 
the race between the grain crop and 
the baby crop! (Borgstrom, 1973, 
p. 2.) 
The future of mankind will depend on 
the balance achieved between future food 
production and future population growth. 
It will be such a close race that scientists 
and technologists are likely to determine 
the outcome. (Scrimshaw, 1974, p. 19.) 
CLIMATE 
We now come to the third and final 
leg of the triad: climate. Population and 
food production projections tradition· 
ally have been based on the assumption 
of a continuing benign climate: there 
may be fluctuations, but on a whole the 
weather will average out. But is this 
assumption realistic? Can we indeed 
count on a rather stable climate? 
The Climate is Changing 
Many experts think that the world's 
climate is indeed changing. (Climate is 
usually defined to be the average weather 
over a thirty-year period at a given locale.) 
These experts only differ as to how soon 
and in what manner it will change. 
It May Get Warmer 
Some experts, such as Dr. Howard A. 
Wilcox of the Naval Undersea Center, pre-
dict that man will eventually reject enough 
heat to the atmosphere, due to the bum· 
ing of fossil fuels, that the average surface 
temperature of the earth will increase 
over 10° F and cause the polar ice caps to 
melt. (1973, p. 36.) This theory is also 
supported by M. L B'udyko of the Soviet 
Union who states: 
one may believe that with preserva-
tion of the present rate of energy 
production growth the thermal bar-
rier will be reached comparatively 
soon (probably not later than a hun-
dred years). (1972, p. 873.) 
It May Get Cooler 
Others note that we may be head-
ing in the opposite direction, that is, 
toward a cooler climate. Handler ob-
serves 
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••• for reasons that are obscure ••• 
the mean temperature of the surface of 
the Northern Hemisphere has declined 
by .1 degree (C) per decade for three or 
four consecutive decades. That may 
sound trivial but it is not. A fall of not 
much more than two degrees would 
surely initiate a new ice age. (1975, 
pp. 14-15.) 
While no one is willing to predict an im· 
mediate ice age, Professor Reginald E. 
Newell of M.LT. observes that 
Every year we see the gradual 
buildup of ice in the Northern Hem· 
isphere and we can record a temper-
ature drop over the ice sheet. We 
have before us all the ingredients of 
an interglacial - glacial change. 
((1974, p. 34.) 
Man v. a New Ice age 
The difference between the two 
points of view lies in our estimation of 
the cause of the change. Those who fore-
see a warmer future point to man-induced 
changes. In a rigorous mathematical anal-
ysis of the energy balance of the earth-
atmosphere system, William D. Sellers 
(1969, p. 399) concluded that man's in· 
dustrial activities, if present trends con-
tinue, will replace solar energy as the 
primary energy input. Such a situation 
would lead to a climate much warmer 
than that of today. 
Others note that earth's long history 
has been filled with many drastic clima· 
tic changes, and we are due - perhaps 
overdue - for another change, While we 
must be cautioned against trying to pre-
dict climatic changes based on past his-
tory, we do realize that the climate does 
indeed keep changing. There is no such 
thing as a normal climate. (Sutcliffe, 
1966, pp. 178-184,) While solar activity 
and volcano eruptions can influence 
weather for a short period of time we 
still cannot determine the causes of 
climatic change. (Halacy, 1968.) 
We cannot tell if we are heading to-
ward another ice age. However, we do 
know that the earth's climatic system is 
very sensitive. Theoretically, conditions 
exist right now for the start of another 
ice age. 
It appears likely that most of 
the climatic variability experienced 
during the Pleistocene epoch can be 
reproduced ••• without changing any 
variable. What apparently is needed, 
however, is an impulse or perturba-
tion • • • to shift the climate ••• 
(Sellers, 1973, p. 252. 
David O. Woodbury puts the same idea 
into layman's language. 
The amazing thing about an 
ice age is that it takes only a hair-
line decision of nature to start it 
and nothing more than the habit 
to keep it going. (1962, p. 190.) 
Consider, for example, Baffin Island, 
an arctic island in Canada. For 
35 years before 1972, Baffin Island had 
been free of snow in summer. Now it is 
permanently snow covered. Since snow 
reflects approximately 80 per cent of 
the sun's radiant energy back to space, 
compared to 30 per cent for bare 
ground, this condition could be signifi· 
cant. An increase in reflected energy 
means a decrease in absorbed energy. A 
decrease in absorbed energy leads to a 
decrease in surface temperature, which 
in turn results in more snow. Without a 
break in the cycle, an ice age could be 
born. 
There are other factors such as ocean 
currents and storm patterns that contri-
bute to this shift in climate. Once started, 
a growing glacial ice sheet tends to 
change storm patterns because the ice 
sheet radiates heat, becomes cold and 
induces a high barometric pressure. Warm 
currents, such as the Gulf Stream, bring 
an enormous quantity of moist air to the 
area. When the moist air overruns the 
cold, it begins to snow, increasing the size 
of the young glacier. 
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The Sensitivity to Temperature Change 
The sensitivity of the earth's climate 
to small changes in temperature is very 
impressive • .An increase in average temp-
erature of only 10° Fis sufficient to melt 
the ice caps. A decrease of only 5° F 
could trigger an ice age, The average 
temperature of an ice age is approximate-
ly 16° F colder than that of the world 
today. 
Also noteworthy is the "extreme sen· 
sitivity of the high latitudes of the North· 
em Hemisphere to factors which would 
produce climatic change." (Sellers, 1973, 
p. 252.) As we have seen, this area is 
where the world gets a major portion of 
its food. Any shift in climate in this area 
could have severe repercussions through· 
out the world. In other words, if we were 
to experience a minor change in the aver· 
age temperature of the world, the North· 
em Hemisphere would probably experi· 
ence a larger change. Food production 
would most likely decline in this region 
and affect the entire world. 
One may still argue that an ice age 
(even if one is coming)or the melting of 
the ice caps (even if it does occur) is a 
long time away. But what we do know is 
that we are experiencing definite shifts 
in weather right now. lri testifying before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture 
Production, Dr. Reid Bryson, Director of 
the Environmental Institute at the Uni· 
versity of Wisconsin, stated that: 
The evidence is now abundantly 
clear that the climate of the Earth is 
changing ... Since about 1940 the 
Northern Hemisphere has been cool· 
ing off, rapidly approaching the 
levels of 100 years ago, but, more 
important than this cooling, the pat• 
tern of climate - especially the pat• 
tern of where the rains fall - has 
already been changing. (World Food 
Situation, 1974, p. 129.) 
The trends in temperature are shown 
in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the 
average temperature of the Northern 
Hemisphere during the past century. 
Figure 5 shows the general trends of tem-
perature changes in Iceland over the past 
thousand years. The temperature in Ice-
land is considered to be a good indicator 
of temperature patterns throughout the 
Northern Hemisphere. These data illus.-
trate the continuing changes which make 
it virtually impossible to define any cli· 
mate as "normal". 
The Effect of Climate on Food Production 
Dr. Bryson commented in U.S. and 
World Food Situation that these changes 
are detrimental to our capability to feed 
ourselves. His comment represents only 
part of the picture. The truth is that any 
change in the weather will be detrimental; 
any change in climate will be cata. 
strophic. 
During the past 40 years of benign 
climate, the population has doubled 
while agriculture has flourished. However, 
in spite of the favorable conditions we 
have not been able to build up our food 
reserves. 
Any change in weather or climate 
will cause disruptions and at least a 
temporary drop in food production. If 
a rain belt shifts from an area of arable 
land to a desert, we might eventually be 
able to cultivate the now arable desert to 
replace the lost farmland. Unfortunately, 
this transition will take time which we 
don't have. Yields will be very low for 
several years while we are cultivating this 
land. lil the meantime, we must realis.-
tically assume that famine will be great. 
If the average temperature drops 
only 2° F, growing seasons will be shor-
tened by two weeks. Plant growth during 
the remaining season will be less vigor· 
ous. Crop yields may be expected to drop 
27 per cent. With a 4° F decrease in tem· 
perature, yields would drop to approxi· 
mately 50 per cent. Such a result would 
truly be catastrophic. 
If temperatures rose, the ice caps 
would start to melt. Many of the world's 
coastal cities would be flooded. Much of 
the world's best farmland would be lost. 
Furthermore, many crops would not do 
very well in the hotter weather. Many 
crops have been optimized to today's cli· 
mate; any change will bring a lower 
yield. Increased growing seasons due to 
the hotter climate would not be able to 
compensate for the lost farmlands and 
lower yields. Again, the result would be 
catastrophic for a great segment of the 
population. Famine would be widespread. 
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Figure 4. Mean Temperature of Northern Hemisphere 
(Source of data: U.So and World Food Situation, 1974.) 
Figure 4 shows the average temperature of the Northern Hemisphere during the past 
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Figure 5. Mean Temperature in Iceland. 
(Source of data: U.S. and World Food Situation, 1974.) 
2000 
Depicted is the estimated mean temperature of Iceland which is considered to be a 
good indicator of Northern Hemisphere temperature patterns, for the past 1,000 years. 
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One may still wish to argue that 
these are long-range possibilities which 
may not actually happen ("at least not in 
my lifetime and who cares what happens 
after that?"). Unfortunately, there are 
ample illustrations of evidence which in· 
dicate that climatic patterns are changing 
at this very time. 
Consider the situation in India. The 
Indian monsoon is critical to agriculture 
in that overcrowded country. At the be-
ginning of this century droughts recurred 
in Northern and Northwest India every 
three or four years. As the earth warmed 
up the frequency of droughts declined 
significantly. As a result, agricultural pro-
duction was good and the population 
quadrupled. Since 1940, however, the 
earth has started to cool off again. Coin-
cidentally drought frequency appears to 
be increasing again. If this trend contin-
ues, the already severe food shortage in 
India will become very much worse. 
CONCLUSION 
It is quite clear that food production 
could not keep pace with population even 
during these times of favorable weather. 
The nagging question now becomes 
"What will happen with harsher weath· 
er?" All evidence indicates that we are 
indeed approaching the end of an era of 
benevolent climate. One must conclude 
that a new era will usher in increased fam-
ine and starvation to an already hungry 
world. The severity of this new era will 
depend upon the magnitude and timing 
of a change in climate. 
Mandate for the Future 
Mankind must take several immedi· 
ate steps to alleviate this problem of 
potentially cataclysmic proportions. 
First, we must continue world-wide ef· 
forts to stabilize population and to 
increase food production. We must de-
crease the dependence of the world on 
North America for its food. Placing all 
our wheat in one basket makes us vulner· 
able to every minor vagary of the weath· 
er. Each region must develop the capa· 
bility of feeding its people, or at least 
develop the means of paying for the food 
and its distribution. 
Finally, we must recognize that the 
benevolent climate which we have en-
joyed during the past is subject to change 
and is changing. We must increase inter· 
national cooperation on weather report-
ing and forecasting. We must be ready to 
respond to changes in climate with plans 
to cultivate new areas. We must develop 
new strains of seeds which will grow un-
der adverse conditions.We must even be 
willing to change our basic crops to re-
optimize caloric yields as conditions 
change. 
We must do all of these things and 
still hope for continued good fortune. We 
are faced perhaps with the biggest prob-
lem in the history of man. Either we will 
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ABSTRACT 
The dichotomy of population growth 
rates between the developed and less de-
veloped countries is discussed. Some of 
the causes of this dichotomy are discus-
sed in relation to the "demographic tran· 
sition" model. A case is made that tech· 
nological colonialism contributed to the 
population crisis and only its reverse, in· 
duced economic growth, will resolve the 
crisis. 
INTRODUCTION 
As we approach the twenty-first cen• 
tury, it would seem that the people of the 
United States are within grasp of a para-
dise on earth. Whereas one hundred years 
ago, mechanization, electricity, air travel, 
high living standards and the forty-hour 
work week were unheard of, all of these 
wonders are common in the United States 
today. However, the mood of the people 
is not one of confidence and anticipation, 
but one of concern for the long-term con• 
tinuation of the human race as we know 
it today. The miraculous technological 
advancements of the United States and 
other developed countries (DC) have 
turned out to be mixed blessings. 
The high standard of Jiving of the 
DC appears to be threatened by the rapid· 
ly increasing populations of the less devel· 
oped countries (LDC) and their anticipa-
ted demands on the world's limited 
resources. To avert a world population 
crisis, the DC have promoted widespread 
use of birth control techniques by the 
LDC. This approach has not resolved the 
real cause of the problem - economic 
stagnation and despair. Stockwell (1968, 
p. 175) discusses economic growth and its 
relationship to population growth and 
stabilization as "demographic transition." 
Evidence suggests that the per capita 
technological and economic growth and 
the population stability of the DC was 
acquired at the expense of the LDC. 
Since the root of the population growth 
problem is economic, the solution should 
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be economic. If the challenge of a stable 
world population is to be achieved, the 
economic status of the LDC must be 
raised so that the natural forces which 
stabilized the population of the DC will 
do the same for the LDC. 
To gain an understanding of the 
magnitude of the problem, historical 
and projected population growth trends 
and the characteristics of the "demo-
graphic transition" model must be 
defined. With this background, the 
evidence for technological colonialism 
as a cause of the population crisis can 
be presented. 
WORLD POPULATION GROWTH 
TRENDS 
Man has populated the earth for 
some two million years. Down through 
the centuries the population has slowly 
but persistently increased. Prior to the 
eighteenth century, however, this in· 
crease had been rather undramatic in 
context with the size of the planet. 
Brown (1957, p. 3) reflects that this was 
• • • "the period when there was little 
change from one generation to the next 
• • • the days of the Black Death, of 
hopeless malnutrition and superstition, of 
ignorance and tyranny." Since then, 
dramatic increases in economic well· 
being and population have occurred. 
The population increase is shown as 
Figure 1. 
The dramatic increase since the 
eighteenth century, to a present popu· 
lation of 3.5 billion, belies the slow stea· 
dy growth of the previous two million 
years. "Historically, accustomed to slow 
and sporadic changes and the visible 
linearity of linked cause and effect, our 
latent assumption is that change is ab-
normal - that stability is the obverse of 
change ••• " (McHale, 1972, p. 4.) 
The question that now concerns us 
is: "Will this new trend continue?" To 
explore this idea, let us look at some of 
the predictions of the population growth 
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Figure lo World Population (1200-2000 AD) 
Depicted in Figure 1 is the dramatic increase in world population, beginning with 
the mid 1 BOO's. A world population of nearly 6 billion is projected for the year 
2000. (Source: McHale, 1972, p. 4o) 
Attention is drawn especially to the increase in the proportion of the total world 
population expected in the underdeveloped regions - from 68.5 to 76.5 per cent., 
This will put severe pressures on the developed regions. (National Research Coun· 
cil, 1969, p. 56.) 
of population is a difficult task, and must 
... "examine the growth on this planet -
population, agricultural production, na· 
tional resources, industrial production 
and pollution." (Meadows, 1972, p. 11.) 
These factors are interrelated and inter· 
dependent. The projections of several 
demographers who considered these fac-
tors are summarized in Figure 2. 
These projections indicate that it 
took the world population approximately 
seventy-five years to double to the pres-
ent 3.5 billion, but will take approxima· 
tely forty years to double again to 7 bi!· 
lion people. Beyond the year 2000, confi· 
dence in the predictions wane and signifi· 
cantly different estimates are made de-
pending on different fertility assump-
tions. 
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The doubling of the population in 
the next forty years, however, masks 
the fact that some countries, notably 
the industrialized countries, have neal°" 
ly stabilized populations, while the 
populations of the LDC are growing at 
a rate significantly higher than the world 
average. This is depicted in Figure 3. 
(National Research Council, 1969, p. 56.) 
As a result of the exploding popula-
tion in the LDC, there has developed an 
increasing concern about a population 
crisis., Can these numbers be fed? Will 
the natural resources be rapidly depleted 
by the requirements of the population 
today and of the tremendous increases 
expected? One cannot effectively dispel 
these concerns. However, one can explore 
the causes of the rapidly rising population 
and, if a root cause is discovered, shed 
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c Lapp, (1973, p. 217, fig. 9-2) 
~Commoner, (1971, p. 114) 
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Figure 2. Composite Population Projections to Year 2100 
Projections of world population to the year 2100 from four sources are illustrated. 
Note the divergence of opinion among the experts past the year 2000. 
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Figure 3o Population and Development, 1965 • 2000 
The projected increase in total world population is attributed to the population 
growth rate of the LDCo The figure depicts a nearly stabilized population for devel· 
oped countries., 
NATURAL STAGES IN DEVELOPING 
A MATURE POPULATION 
(DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION) 
Why is the population growth rate of 
the LDC larger than that of the developed 
countries? To determine this, we must 
first look at man's basic human reproduca 
tive influences. The birth rate is not only 
affected by biological factors, such as 
fertility and contraception, but by 
equally powerful social factors. The rate 
at which a population grows is determin-
ed by the difference between the birth 
rate and the death rate. Prior to the emer-
gence of the agricultural/technologically 
oriented society, the birth rate was be--
tween forty-five and fifty births per one 
thousand persons per year, But, through-
out this same period, the death rate very 
nearly equaled births. "A short life exa 
pectancy of about twenty years prevailed 
during the greater part of the time man 
led a food-gathering existence." (Brown, 
1957' p. 440) 
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As various. societies adopted agri-
culture, their death rates dropped. As 
an increasing percentage of the world's 
population passed from food-gathering to 
an agrarian existence, the population 
multiplied rapidly. But as towns increa-
sed and population approached the limit 
of food production, pestilence, malnutria 
tion and famine appeared, and the number 
of people who died each year approached 
the number of people who were born. 
The average death rates increased to the 
levels which had prevailed during the days 
of the earlier food-gathering cultures. 
Society continued to live at the limit of 
its food producing capacity. 
With the emergence of the technofog-
ical/industrial society, death rates once 
again decreased. The decreasing death 
rates resulted from man's new power over 
his environment. As population increased, 
man's advances in agriculture and indus-
try continued to grow rapidly, significant-
ly increasing his standard of living. For 
the first time in his long history, industri-
alized man no longer lived on the edge of 
famine. As man's standard of living rose, 
the birth rate began to decline, until it 
nearly matched the annual death rate of 
ten to twelve deaths per thousand in the 
industrialized countries. 
Chamberlain (1970, p. 8.) defines the 
above process as "demographic transition" 
and synopsizes it as follows: 
Stage One characterizes pre-
industrial societies. A high birth rate 
(four to six or more children per 
childbearing woman) is offset by a 
high death rate, producing a rela-
tively stable population. 
In Stage Two, modern sanitation 
begins to make its entrance on the 
scene, a technological advance rather 
easily diffused. Other forms of 
disease prevention assist in curtailing 
the mortality rate. At first the great-
er number of surviving children helps 
to swell the population, but then the 
rising urban industrial and commer-
cial middle class purposely limit the 
number of children as a means of 
improving their own status and secur-
ing the future of those fewer child-
ren. 
At this point industrial (or post-
industrial) society has entered Stage 
Three. Social planning limits both 
the number of deaths and births. 
Once again population growth achie-
ves a kind of stability, with only 
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minor fluctuations, but now the bal-
ance between nature and man is a 
consequence of man's improved mas-
tery and procreation, rather than of 
nature's impervious control over man. 
Stockwell (1968, p. 175.) succinctly 
defines a model of the "demographic 
transition" in Figure 4. 
While the "demographic transition" 
model explains the occurrences of the 
presently developed countries, what 
about the less developed countries? Their 
death rates have declined, but an accom• 
panying decline in birth rate similar to 
that of the industrialized countries has 
not occurred. Other factors must affect 
the relationship. 
A CASE FOR TECHNOLOGICAL 
COLONIALISM AS THE CAUSE OF 
THE POPULATION CRISIS 
In analyzing the current situation of 
the LDC, we will examine the causes of 
two aspects of the demographic transi· 
tion. 
1. The lack of per capita economic 
growth during the transition. 
2. The rate at which the developed 
countries passed through the 
transition compared with the 
LDC. 
Lack of Economic Growth 
During the period of 1800 to the 
mid-twentieth century when the now-
developed countries were passing through 
Stage Two of their transition, they re-
quired increasingly large amounts of natu-
ral resources to support their industrial 
growth. They satisfied this need through 
political colonialism. The developed 
countries exploited the LDC by taking 
their natural resources to fuel their own 
transition through Stage Two. Commoner 
(1971, p. 244.) states that the wealth of 
E&JUJUJi!Sii!CJ. ff 
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(Stockwell 1968, p. 175) 
Figure 4o Demographic Transition Model 
This model shows that the transition progresses from an initial balance of high birth 
and death rates through a period of sustained population growth to a new balance of 
low birth and death rates.. 
the advanced nations is largely a result of 
the application of modern science and 
technology to the exploitation of natural 
resources. He further clarifies his position 
with the following example. 
Thus, the Dutch brought into 
their Indonesian colonies modern 
techniques that improved living con-
ditions and reduced the mortality 
rate in the native populationo And, 
according to the anthropologist 
Clifford Geetz, who has made a care-
ful demographic study of the colon-
ial period in Indonesia, the Dutch ap-
parently fostered the growth of the 
Indonesian population in order to in-
crease the labor force that they need-
ed to exploit the colony's natural 
resources.. However, much of the 
wealth acquired as a result of the in-
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creased productivity did not remain 
in Indonesia, Rather, it was acquired 
by the Netherlands where it suppoP. 
ted the Dutch through their own 
demographic transitiono In effect, 
the first, or population-stimulating 
stage of the demographic transition 
in Indonesia became coupled to the 
second, or population-limiting phase 
of the demographic transition in the 
Netherlands - a kind of demographic 
parasitism., Then, in a final irony, 
with the postwar development of 
synthetic chemicals, Indonesia's 
natural rubber trade declined, further 
depleting the opportunities for the 
economic advancement that might 
support their own motivation for 
population control.. 
Brown (1957, p. 47.) clarifies ana 
other aspect of colonialism as follows: 
In India, for example, popula-
tion was apparently at one time ef· 
fectively limited in large part by re· 
current famines. But with the con-
struction of extensive transportation 
and irrigation systems and medical 
services (by DC), famine was virtu· 
ally eliminated and population stead· 
ily increased. Hut all too often out· 
right starvation was replaced as a 
major cause of death by an increased 
incidence of a variety of diseases. 
The susceptibilities of individuals to 
these diseases were accentuated by 
chronic and widespread malnutrition. 
Nevertheless, the net result has been 
to reduce the death rates. Thus a new 
phenomenon has appeared in the 
modem world - declining mortality 
and expanding population in the al>-
sence of significant economic im· 
provement. 
Unfortunately, the result of the 
above two analyses is stagnation in Phase 
Two of demographic transition; it is for-
cing the world into a population crisis. 
Rapid population growth soon becomes 
an anchor to economic growth rather 
than an aid. This is succinctly pointed out 
by Heilbroner. (1968, p. 68.) 
The Aswan High Dam in Egypt 
- one of the most colossal engineer-
ing undertakings in any underdevel• 
oped nation . . . will generate three 
times the total amount of electric--
ity now produced in Egypt. Its over-
all impact on increasing agricultural 
production, may run as high as 
forty-five per cent. Meanwhile, how-
ever, that figure happens to be the 
percentage by which Egyptian popu-
lation is estimated to rise in the ten· 
year period during which the dam 
will be under construction. Hence, 
despite the long term gain in power, 
the near term effect in raising the per 
capita living standards will be zero. 
The entire gigantic enterprise will 
only succeed in preventing the 
Egyptian economy from suffocating 
under its proliferating human mass. 
smw;p'"'tift''&'ij 
Rapid Drop in Death Rates 
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The remammg aspect which dif· 
ferentiates the LDC demographic 
transition through Stage Two from that 
of the DC is the rate at which the trig. 
gering mechanism -has occurred. As 
pointed out by Symonds (1973, p. 3'3), 
"The decline in mortality which in 
Europe has been spread over a century 
was achieved often in little more than 
a decade in many less developed coun-
tries." As with any change, the recog. 
nition of decreasing mortality and, 
more importantly, the acceptance and 
resultant action (lowering birth rates), 
take a considerable length of time. 
Because of the slow Stage Two tran· 
sition in the European countries' popu-
lations growth was rapid but not run-
away, and social adaption to lowering 
birth rates had sufficient time to assist, 
rather than retard, economic growth. 
Because of this slow process of social 
adaptation, one should not expect a 
rapid drop in birth rate to accompany 
the rapid decline in death rate unless a 
driving force is exerted. Without this 
social adaptation and other factors, 
economic development cannot succeed. 
Heilbroner (1963, p. 67) -:ecognized this 
problem in stating " ••• that economic 
development, in the sense of a broadly 
based and shared upward climb, must 
wait on the establishment of social 
change on the grand scale." 
The developed countries have now 
recognized this problem and are exerting 
influence in trying to reduce population 
growth by massive programs of birth 
control. These programs, however, have 
not met with resounding, uniform suc-
cesses. This should be expected since as 
was pointed out in the demographic 
transition model, economic growth must 
accompany the drop in death rates in 
order to encourage a drop in birth rates. 
Heilbroner (1963, p. 113) recognized 
this and states that "Only uplifting the 
people and enlarging their cultural hori-
zons will flatten out the curve." (i.e., 
population growth.) 
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CONCLUSION 
We have just completed a presenta-
tion which discussed the alarming rate of 
the world population growth and contras-
ted the growth rate of the DC with the 
LDC. In focusing on the causes of the sus-
tained high growth rates of the LDC in 
the absence of economic growth, we have 
shown this to be in contradiction with 
the demographic transition experienced 
by the DC. Some of the causes of this 
phenomenon were attributed to technol-
ogical colonialism and its artificial trigger-
ing of the population growth rate. It is 
recognized that many other factors can 
and do influence the social and economic 
plight of the LDC. Focusing on the root 
cause of the stagnation of the LDC in 
Stage Two of the demographic transition, 
however, may help one develop better 
solutions to this problem. Since colonial-
ism resulted in removing the wealth of 
the LDC to help the DC pass through the 
transition to a stable population, the 
reverse process may well speed the LDC 
through its transition. Commoner (1971, 
p. 24 7) summarized the task as follows: 
Both the environmental and 
population crises are the largely unin-
tended result of the exploitation of 
technological, economic and political 
power. Their solutions must also be 
found in this difficult area. This task 
is unprecedented in human history in 
its size, complexity and urgency. 
It is natural to seek for easier 
solutions. Since the basic problems 
are themselves biological limitation 
of population growth and the main-
tenance of ecological balance, there 
is a temptation to short-circuit the 
complex web of economic social and 
political issues and to seek direct bio-
logical solutions particularly for the 
population crisis. I am persuaded 
that such reductionist attempts would 
fail. 
The solution to the problem lies not 
solely in population control, but in has-
tening the LDC through the demographic 
transition by directing technological and 
political power to the task of inducing 
rapid economic growth. Because of the 
finite resources and food production 
capability, the consequences of failure 
in this challenge will be the resumption of 
nature's age-old method of population 
control: entire populations may be dec-
imated by famine and disease. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the p0$ibility 
that the greatest benefit of the computer 
may lie in the fact that it forces those 
who work with it into more disciplined 
and thorough thought patterns. Three 
popular misconceptions about computers 
are discussed, and two major factors pre-
sent in every computer application, the 
Dynamic System and the Total Systems 
Approach, are shown to be the main 
forces driving man into more disciplined 
thinking. The effect of this is extrapola-
ted to the general population, and some 
possible impacts on technology and pub-
lic policy are explored. 
INTRODUCTION 
To begin with, please note that the 
last word in the title of this article reads 
"think" and not "drink". Everyone 
knows that computers have driven many 
a man to drink (and deservedly so). Not 
many are yet aware that computers are 
leading men to think, perhaps not the 
way that Aristotle or Newton could 
think, but rather in the way the average 
person is capable of thinking, but rarely 
does. Until recently, many people have 
allowed a few others to do their thinking 
for them because genuine thinking truly 
is hard work. 
The objective of this paper is to sug-
gest that the computer may be changing 
this situation by literally forcing people 
to think in a disciplined, no-nonsense 
way. If this actually is happening, then 
it may be recorded someday that the 
computer was the greatest of man's inven-
tions. 
WHAT HATH MAN WROUGHT? 
When it comes to computers this is a 
good question. Jilst what has man brought 
about? To paraphrase a familiar quota-
tion from the Book of Genesis, "And 
man created the computer in his own im-
age, in the image of man created he it." 
In other words, man invested a ma-
chine that could process data in a manner 
somewhat analogous to the way his own 
mind works. lfis invention was successful, 
but it contained a "Catch 22" for which 
he had not bargained. The "catch" is this: 
the computer is designed to do exactly 
what man tells it to do, rather than what 
man wants it to do. Man, therefore, must 
cope with a machine that unfailingly, in-
stantly, and without remorel!,reveals his 
every error in thinking, even to the tiniest 
detail. 
The impact of the realization of this 
fact has been so profound that even to-
day, some thirty years after the birth of 
the computer, man has difficulty admit-
ting it to himself. He still makes state-
men ts such as "the computer really foul-
ed up my telephone bill," or "this listing 
the computer turned out is is pure gar-
bage." 'But these attempts to shift the 
blame do not account for such mistakes 
any more than one can blame a firearm 
for shooting or a car for "accidently" 
running into a tree. Except in the rare 
case of mechanical failure, it is the man 
behind the gun, automobile, or computer 
who makes the mistake. 
Increasingly man is coming to realize 
that the computer mirrors his thinking, 
and if he is to be thought wise, his think-
ing must be sound and true. We will dis-
cuss later in this paper how man is learn-
ing to do "sound and true" thinking. But 
first, we wish to dispel some emotionally 
charged, popular myths about the compu-
ter that tend to obscure the concept this 
paper is addressing. 
POPULAR MYTHS 
Several popular myths which seem to 
persist are that: 
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1. The computer will be the demon 
that brings about the Orwellian 
world of 1984, 
2. 'Computer automation will put 
men out of work, and 
3. The computer is a "Super Brain" 
that can really think. 
221 ma cw.11 
The 1964 scenario is described vivid· 
ly by Knelman (1971, p. 260) who warns 
Whoever ran the computers 
could know when the individual en• 
tered the highway, and where he got 
off; how many bottles of Scotch or 
Vermouth he purchased from the 
liquor store; who paid the rent for 
the girl in Apartment 43; who went 
to the movies between two and four 
P .M. on a working day at the office; 
who was at lunch at Luigi's or the 
Four Seasons on Tuesday, 8.eptem· 
ber 15; and the hotel at which Mrs. 
Smith spent the rainy afternoon last 
Sunday. 
The key point made by Knelman is that 
just as man can misuse the computer, so 
can he misuse anything else. To prevent 
the 1984 scenario from becoming reality, 
we must control the "man who runs the 
computers." 
With respect to the second myth, 
that computer automation will put men 
out of work, the myth still persists al· 
though it is not as prevalent as it once 
was. Walker puts this myth nicely to rest; 
•.. the "obituary accounting" 
approach to automation ignores the 
fact that its primary benefit is likely 
to be in extending the boundaries of 
men's knowledge and enabling them 
to perform jobs that could not be 
done at all without automatic data 
processing. (Walker, 1962, p. 326) 
Turning our attention now to the 
"Super Brain" myth, Lapp pinpoints the 
kernel that disturbs many people 
Furthermore the computer serves 
as more than a repository for facts; 
one can program into it instructions 
on how to respond (make decisions) 
to situations and even how to adapt 
to new situations on the basis of ele· 
mentary learning. It is this capability 
that sends a chill down the spine of a 
layman; for he senses that man's 
three-pound computer will be no 
match for modem competition •• ·• 
the natural evolution of computers 
proceeds from the dumb stage to 
machines that will eventually take 
the THINK sign off the IBM office 
wall and incorporate it in their in· 
nards. (Lapp, 1965, pp. 5-6) 
This reminds the author of a recent 
cartoon where a scientist standing in 
front of a large computer is startled to see 
a paper issue from the computer on 
which is printed, "I compute, therefore I 
am." Gottlieb after much research into 
'this area, assures us this is never likely to 
happen. 
In spite of converging efforts by 
scientists from many disciplines, it.is 
turning out to be enormously diffi· 
cult to understand how memory, 
learning, recognition, and concep-
tualization take place in the brain. 
But the more it is learned, the more 
clear it becomes that present-day 
computers and computer programs 
are far too simple to be accepted as 
representations for these complex 
mechanisms and processes. (Gottlieb, 
1973, p. 149) 
Having dispensed with these three 
popular myths, let us now turn our atten• 
tion to how the computer is improving 
man's thinking processes. Basically, this 
improved thinking comes through greater 
discipline demanded by computer-forced 
use of (1) the Dynamic System, and (2) 
System Development. Each will be dis-
cuzsed in turn. 
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THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
When man first began using the com-
puter, he quickly discovered that what 
seemed to be a lengthy process actually 
involved only three basic steps: 
1. instructions given to the compu· 
ter 
2. 'data given to the computer 
3. information retrieved from the 
computer 
Furthermore, he discovered that if 
the computer outputs fed back to him 
were incorrect, he could correct his think· 
ing errors by 
1. correcting his instructions to the 
computer 
2. 'correcting the data he gave the 
computer, or 
3. 'correcting both instructions and 
input data. 
Once man had the computer performing 
to his satisfaction he found, to his delight, 
that he could exercise complete control 
in the same manner. Thus, the simple, but 
extremely important Dynamic System il· 





But how does the Dynamic Systems 
Model improve man's thinking? In two 
ways: 
1. 'it provides him with a structure 
for which he must analyze and 
fit the problems he is trying to 
solve, and 
2.. 'it absolutely forces him to think 
through and account for every 
detail in every part of the system. 
If he follows this disciplined methodol-
ogy of thinking properly, he reaps the 
reward of success. Bi.It if he uses fuzzy or 
wishful thinking, or if he neglects to 
account for every detail, the system will 
not work and he must stand in the spot;.. 
light of failure. 
The next question arises as to whe-
ther there is any indication that use of 
'the Dynamic Systems Model has improv-
ed man's thinking. To answer that ques.-
tion look again at Figure 1 and replace 
-
Control Feedback 
INPUT COMPUTER OUTPUT 
-
-
- INFORMATION DATA 
Figure 1. Dynamic System Model 
The figure suggests that man exercises control over the computer by adjusting input 
data and instructions. This adjustment process reveals error in man's thinking and as 
a consequence, forces him to think in a more disciplined and thorough fashion. 
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"input data" with "material," "computer" 
with "factory," and "output informa-
tion" with "products." 'Now we have a 
model of the recycling process that is so 
important today. As another example, 
take Figure 1 again and replace "input 
data" with "fuel/air mixture," "compu-
ter" with "internal combustion engine," 
"output information" with "combustion 
products," and "man" with "smog con-
trol device." Now we have an air pollu-
tion control system. 
Is this similarity of systems purely 
coincidental? Or is there the possibility 
that after years of disciplined thinking 
forced by the computer application of 
the Dynamic System, man is now suc-
cessfully applying this form of thinking 
to the increasing number of technological 
problems he is encountering? At this 
point, let us leave the questions that have 
been raised, to consider the other half of 
the picture which portrays the way com-
puter technology may be causing man to 
improve his thinking System Develop-
ment. 
THE TOT AL SYSTEMS APPROACH 
Having mastered the Dynamic Sys-
tem within the computer room, man was 
next faced with the much more difficult 
task of mastering the Dynamic System 
outside the computer room. In order to 
develop an automatic data processing 
program to do an improved job, he 
found that, starting from the beginning, 
he had to: 
1. thoroughly understand the old 
method of doing the job; 
2. devise a superior method of 
accomplishing it; 
3. economically justify its net 
worth in dollars and cents; 
4. specify every detail and oversee 
every facet of development; 
5. train everyone involved in the 
program in how to properly pro-
vide the necessary inputs and 
effectively use the outputs; 
6. 'implement the entire system to 
run smoothly; and 
7. carefully monitor the system to 
maintain it in an operational 
condition. 
Again, the computer was quick to 
tell if the analyst had made any mental 
mistakes in developing the system. By 
now, many other people were involved 
in the system. Ramo sums it up nicely: 
Either we take the systems-
approach route and perform well, or 
we accept absolute and utter confu-
sion and chaos •• • For certain classes 
of problems, if you take away the 
compatibility, the harmony of the 
ensemble, if you fail to ensure the 
appropriate kind of interactions -
in short, if you do not work the 
problem as the system problem that 
it really is - then you will have an 
absolute failure, not merely an inef-
ficient compromise. (Ramo, 1969, 
p. 27) 
Anyone who has ever worked with com· 
puters will give a hearty "amen" to that 
statement. 
Brown provides an example of what 
happens when total systems considera-
tions are ignored: 
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The plight of the Sahelian zone 
countries of Africa is often blamed 
on several years of drought. While 
drought itself has certainly brought 
hardship and tragedy to these coun· 
tries, a. much more basic problem in 
the Sahel preceded the drought and 
will persist in destroying the produc-
tive capacity of the region if uncheck· 
ed. The continuous growth in human 
and livestock populations beyond the 
carrying capacity of the area's fragile 
ecosystem has led to overgrazing and 
deforestation, creating conditions 
where the desert is moving south-
ward at an accelerating rate. The 
drought has now brought these 
catastrophic trends into sharp focus. 
(Brown, 1975, p. 130) 
The importance that total systems 
approach is having on the world is per-
haps best exemplified by a commentator 
in The Statesman, Calcutta's century-old 
and most prestigious journal, whom 
Moynihan quotes: 
It would be unwise for policy 
planners in the developing world to 
dismiss too easily ••• tlie basic prem-
ise of a society that worships success: 
if you are poor, you have only youl'-
self to blame. Development is a mat-
ter of hard work and discipline. So if 
you are not developing fast, it is not 
because the rules of the game are 
stacked against you or that structul'-
al changes are never easy to bring 
about, but because you are lazy or 
undisciplined. (Moynihan, 1975, 
p. 23) 
COMPUTER-INSPIRED THINKING 
Now that we understand the Dyna-
mic Systems Model and the Total Systems 
Approach, let us return to the question of 
whether these disciplines are causing a 
greater number of men to increasingly 
think in a disciplined fashion. Sanders 
cites some revealing statistics: 
In 1956, there were only about 
600 computers installed in the United 
States; in 1970 the number had risen 
to 90,000; in 1975 the number is 
expected to be approaching 200,000; 
and it is predicted that 350,000 will 
be in use by 1980. (Sanders, 1975, 
p. 54) 
No definitive Department of Labor 
statistics are available, but if we multiply 
the number of computers by only a mod-
est factor it is apparent that well over 
1,000,000 people are now subjected to 
computer-required thought disciplines. It 
might be inferred that never in our his-
tory have so many been required to 
think so well. Toward the Year 2018 
reflects upon this inference: 
But perhaps the greatest change 
in the next fifty years will be in the 
way we look at the world - the 
world of both the physical and the 
human. For developments in mem-
ory storage, communication, and 
computers all weave together to 
make power of rationalization more 
attractive and more pervasive. Even 
now men are increasingly thinking of 
their activities, environments, and 
relationships in terms of rationalis-
tic patterns as being the highest 
desiderata. It is in this respect that 
the computer looms as handmaiden 
to the rational scientific approach to 
human affairs. 
But is there any demonstrated proof 
that man's thinking has improved because 
of the computer? The answer is that it 
may be too early to tell. Iii. addition to 
the previously mentioned recycling exam-
ples, some possible examples that come 
to mind are that the systems approach 
was the key element in putting man on 
the moon, and that the public appears to 
be questioning proposed Federal spend-
ing programs with a systems approach. 
The latter example illustrates that 
perhaps man's thinking has become more 
disciplined. Early in this century when 
the Teapot Dome scandal was revealed, 
people recognized that, like an iceberg, 
90% of the problem was concealed. As a 
result, certain Cabinet officers went to 
jail. Three years ago, the Watergate affair 
came to light. This time, however, people 
recognized that the Watergate Problem 
was more than an 'iceberg'. For the first 
time in our history, the public demanded 
to know where the 'iceberg' was heading 
and from which 'glacier' it had originated. 
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And furthermore, from which 'mountain· 
top' did the 'glacier' originate? In short, 
for perhaps the first time, the total sys-
tems investigation approach was applied 
to a major national problem. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented the sugges-
tion that the true benefit of the computer 
to mankind may yet be unrecognized. 
This benefit results from the fact that the 
computer has forced a significant portion 
of our population to think more and in a 
more organized, disciplined way than ever 
before. If this is true, then the ampli· 
fication of man's thinking ability applied 
to future technological problems is 
awesome to contemplate. Iri the words of 
Dr. Philip Handler, President of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 
Mathematicians and solid state 
physicists gave us the digital com· 
puter. So profound is its impact 
that one may reasonably wonder 
whether in so doing, man has guided 
his own evolution - in the sense that 
a human being combined with a com• 
puter represents almost a new spe-
cies. (Handler, 1975, p. 1) 
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ABSTRACT 
The computer has been part of our 
technological society for only twenty-five 
short years, yet its impact has touched 
the lives of all individuals. 'The brief ten 
year history of the computerized data 
bank as it affects the privacy of all Ameri-
cans is outlined. The proposal for a 
National Data Center, which made the 
American public aware of the real threat 
to individual privacy, was formulated in 
the mid-1960's. It was not until 1974 
that landmark legislation occurred with 
the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974. 
Since this legislation is aimed primarily 
at government data banks, the public 
wants still more comprehensive legisla-
tion to protect it from data banks in the 
private sector. There is evidence to indi-
cate that such legislation will be passed in 
the near future. 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to show 
how a technological advancement, the in-
vention of the computer, has Jed to a seri-
ous problem for the American public: the 
loss of individual privacy. This paper at.-
tempts to isolate when this threat became 
apparent to the American public and how 
this public is coping with it. 
A Technological Advancement 
When Charles Babbage, an English 
mathematician, put together his "Calcula· 
ting Engine" in the early nineteenth cen· 
tury, "he sought to lighten the drudgery 
of those condemned to make laborious 
astronomical computations." (Mumford, 
1970, p. 188) Mathematically oriented, 
his engine was designed to calculate and 
print mathematical tables. A few years 
later, Babbage turned his attention to his 
"Analytical Engine." It is significant to 
mention that this engine included a mem-
ory unit which could store data. (Arnold, 
1969, p. 26) The modern computer was 
invented a century later. The modern 
computer can store not only data, but 
also instructions. Instructions are com-
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bined into programs which process the 
data and solve problems. 
A Computer Revolution 
Many people feel that this technol-
ogical advancement, the invention of the 
computer, has improved their "quality 
of life." One has only to read a daily 
newspaper to find examples of how com-
puter technology has benefited our soci-
ety and government. Iii many fields such 
as space travel, education, medicine, busi-
ness, and Jaw enforcement, advances have 
been made that were only science fiction 
a few years earlier. As a result, in the 
past quarter century we have learned to 
rely on the capacity of the computer so 
that we may function in our society. 
With a "multi-billion-person society" the 
computer, mass data processing, and com-
munication are absolute necessities. 
(Mestene, 1970, p. 86) 
As we look into the future, we are 
certain that we will continue to rely upon 
the computer. In his book, Future Shock 
Alvin Toffler makes many predictions in-
volving the influence of the computer on 
the individual. The book references the 
computer more than two dozen times in 
its index. Toffler says, "we have scarcely 
touched on the computer revolution and 
the far-ramifying changes that must fol-
low in its churning wake." (Toffler, 
1970, p. 216) 
PRIVACY IN A TECHNOLOGICAL 
SOCIETY 
Four Types of Privacy 
We recognize that the norms of pri-
vacy differ among societies. Alan F. 
Westin has done a thorough study of 
privacy in America, including a study of 
data banks in a free society for the 
National Academy of Science (Westin 
1972). In his book, Privacy and Freedom, 
Westin identifies four general states or 
functions that privacy creates for indi-
viduals and groups in Western democratic 
nations: solitude, intimacy, anonymity 
and reserve. (Westin, 1967, p. 32) 
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Solitude, the first state of privacy, 
is a situation in which "the individual is 
separated from the group and freed from 
the observation of other persons." In his/ 
her second state of privacy, intimacy, the 
individual functions in a small unit and 
exercises a "corporate seclusion" such as 
in a family, friendship circle or work 
clique. His/her third state of privacy, 
anonymity, occurs when the individual is 
in a public place, such as riding in a sub-
way or attending a ball game, "but still 
seeks, and finds, freedom from identifica-
tion and surveillance." Reserve, his/her 
fourth state of privacy, is "the creation of 
a psychological barrier against unwanted 
intrusion." (I lid p. 32) 
This creation of mental distance, or 
reserve, acts by withholding information; 
this is the dynamic aspect of privacy in 
daily interpersonal relations. The manner 
in which the individual uses his/her re-
serve is the essence of securing meaning-
ful privacy in the "crowded, organization-
dominated setting of modern industrial 
society and urban life." (lbid,.p. 32) 
Privacy Declines 
in a Technological Society 
ln Technological Change, Mesthene 
asserts that individual privacy declines in 
in a complex technological society. 
(Mesthene, 1970, p. 82) He offers the 
notion that individual privacy declines in 
two ways: involuntary and voluntary. 
The individual involuntarily experiences 
invasion of privacy when he/she is involv-
ed in such activities as the filing of an in-
come tax return or becoming a victim of 
wiretapping. On the other hand, the indi-
vidual may voluntarily trade some of his/ 
her privacy for benefits that he/she 
values more highly. Examples of the vol· 
untary trading of privacy would be having 
a telephone (and therefore being listed in 
the telephone directory) or in applying 
for social security benefits. (Ibid., pp. 82-
83) 
There are those who declare that the 
individual must be prepared to give up 
his/her privacy in an overpopulated and 
technological society. Ferkiss (1969, p. 
227) says that fears of privacy completely 
vanishing "are based on the twin postu-
lates of overcrowding and absolute sur-
veillance." He later admits that, while 
societies may differ with regard to their 
definition and value of privacy, it is nec-
essary to have some degree of privacy 
"for the maintenance of human self." 
(Ibid., p. 180) 
THE PRIVACY THREAT UNFOLDS 
The Gathering of Data on Individuals 
It is a common belief that one makes 
better decisions with sufficient informa-
tion. With insufficient information, one is 
more likely to make poor decisions. In 
presenting the defense for gathering of 
data on individuals by the government, 
Calder (1969, pp. 218-19) states: 
Greater and more detailed in· 
formation about individuals can 
make for more efficient govern· 
ment. It may also, if properly 
handled, lead to more humane 
government and greater attention 
to the individual's wishes and needs 
• • • Social research, censu&-taking, 
tax collection, public health inspec-
tions, criminal investigations and 
many other incursions into privacy 
are accepted as not merely sensible 
but desirable. 
In their book, Social Issues in Com-
puting, Gottlieb and Borodin (1973, pp. 
68-69) identify the types of data com-
monly gathered about individuals. Table 1 
lists the nineteen types of data and pro-
vides an excellent backdrop as we watch 
the privacy threat unfold. 
73 
The National Data Center Proposal 
In 1965, the Social Science Research 
Council received a committee report pro-




TYPES OF DATA ABOUT INDIVIDUALS 
1. Identification 
Name, maiden name (if applicable), social insurance number, date 
of birth, place of birth, citizenship, address, appearance, physical 
features, marital status, names of family 
2. Employment 
Occupation, current employer, employment history, earnings, 
education and training, qualifications 
3. Medical 
Current health status, medical decription and history, genetic 
factors, reportable diseases, x-rays, immunizations, dental history, 
health plan and participation 
4. Education 
Schools attended, educational attainments, professional licenses, 
awards, loans 
5. Taxation 
Earnings, investment income, foreign holdings, dependents 
6. Financial 
Bank account history, holdings, earnings, credit and loan history, 
life insurance 
7. Military service 
Rank and qualifications, service record, disciplinary record, 
medical record 
8. Vehicle registration 
Owner, vehicle identification, origin, insurance, accident record 
9. Real estate 
Owner, property identification, description, zoning, assessment 
and taxation, uses 
10. License and permits 
Identification, type of license, dates, insurance 
11. Travel 
Passport, visas, countries visited, customs and duty payments 
12. Welfare 
Agency, history, dependents, aid received, earnings 
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TABLE 1-- Continued 
13. Civil action 
History, ccurt identification, dates, outcomes 
14. Police records 
Offense:', warrants, convictions, confinements, probation and 
parole, political affiliations 
15. Customer accounts 
Company, sales history, credit status 
16. Life insurance 
Identification, value, history, other insurance, medical data 
1 7. Mailing lists 
Type, source, customer profile, history of purchases 
18. Biographical 
Irentification, curriculum vitae, accomplishments, publications, 
memberships, relatives 
19. Membership 
Organization, history, participation, financial, ralatives 
The table lists 19 of the most common types of data gathered about 
individuals, as identified by Gotlieb and Borodin in their book Social 
Issues in Computing (1973, p. 69, TABLE 5-1). 
established by the Bureau of the Budget. 
Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., a Bureau of the BudQ 
get consultant, recommended in a report 
that such a data center be implemented 
"to facilitate the efficient retrieval of 
information as government branches out 
into the more complex areas of poverty, 
health, urban renewal, and education, 
which require new and different uses of 
data,'' \Westin, 1967, p. 317) The news 
media expressed an alarmed and almost 
negative reaction to these recommendaQ 
tions. 
Congress Stops the National Data Center 
Congress entered the picture in the 
debate over a National Data Center with 
the creation of the Subcommittee on 
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Invasion of Privacy, chaired by Represen-
tative Cornelius Gallagher. This House 
subcommittee did not investigate compu-
ters in 1965, but dealt with data survei!Q 
lance in respect to government surveys 
which might infringe on the citizen's 
privacy. During the investigation, Chair-
man Gallagher remarked, "The magic of 
computers is helping (federal agencies) 
gather such a wealth of information from 
a variety of sources that all of us may 
someday stand psychologically naked." 
{Ibid., p. 315) 
In 1966, the Gallagher Committee 
held hearings on computers and privacy 
with the National Data Center as the 
main topic. As the hearings progressed, 
it was revealed that the identities of any 
individuals or businesses reporting infor-
mation would have to be maintained, so 
that the validity of the data could be 
assessed. It was now clear that privacy 
would not be assured! Chairman 
Gallagher called the proposed National 
Data Center a "monster" and an "octo-
pus". (Ibid., pp. 319-20) 
Later in 1966, the President's Task 
Force on the Storage of and Access to 
Government Statistics (the Kaysen Com• 
mittee) recommended that the National 
Data Center be established. The com· 
mittee's report heavily emphasized the 
issue of privacy and called for legisla· 
tion to assure privacy. (Ibid., p. 320) 
Computer privacy hearings were held 
in 1967 by a Senate Subcommittee 
chaired by Senator Long. The National 
Data Bank concept was eventually re-
jected in 1968 in House Report No. 
1842, titled "Privacy and the National 
Data Bank Concept." (Gottlieb, 1973, 
p. 73) 
The Privacy Threat is Apparent 
Just as William F. Buckley, Jr. 
had observed a few years earlier, "More 
and more it becomes plain that privacy is 
the key to liberty" (Buckley, 1965, 
p. 455), the American public realized that 
vital freedoms were being threatened. 
Prompted by the proposal for the National 
Data Center, even the United Nations 
issued a statement showing concern for 
human rights throughout the world. 
(Hoos, 1972, p. 229) 
Legislation Needed 
There were no existing pressure 
groups, other than Congress and the 
courts, to sound effective warnings of the 
dangers of loss of privacy. (Kahn, 1967, 
p. 390) The courts had tried to cope 
with privacy problems under the common 
law. However, there were too many defi· 
ciencies in the common-law approach to 
deal effectively with privacy issues. 
(Miller, 1971, p. 187) 
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Attempts had been made to protect 
the individual by laws such as the Free-
dom of Information Act of 1967, the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, and the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act of 1969. (Gottlieb, 1973, pp. 77-
78) However, in examining the legal 
problems of protecting privacy, it can be 
concluded that such laws are too narrow 
in coverage. "Umbrella" legislation deal-
ing with privacy is needed. 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
GET LEGISLATION 
Legislation is Introduced 
Senator Sam J. Ervin introduced 
Senate Bill 1791 in 1969 primarily to 
draw attention to the problem of pri-
vacy. It limited the federal government 
data-collection activities to those author-
ized by Congress. (Miller, 1971, pp. 221-
22) However, there would be many more 
bills on privacy introduced into Congress 
and five years would elapse before such a 
bill would become law. 
Studies and Recommendations Follow 
In June of 1974, the results of a 
study by the staff of the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
was released. This study showed the 
scope of the federal government's collec-
tion of personal data on individuals. "The 
study found 858 data banks in 54 federal 
agencies, the majority of them not legis-
latively authorized." '(Mathiasen, 1975, 
p. 293) 
In another study, released in August, 
1974, specific needs for privacy legisla· 
tion were recommended by the Republi· 
can Research Committee's Task Force on 
Privacy chaired by Representative Barry 
M. Goldwater, Jr. The Task Force studied 
and made recommendations in the twelve 
specific areas shown in Table 2. (Frey, 
1974, pp. 1-10, attachment) 
TABLE 2 
HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITI'EE PRIVACY 














Area of Recommendation 
Government Surveillance 
Federal Information Collection 









Computer Data Banks 
Code of Ethics 
Listed are the twelve areas of recommendations concerning the specific 
needs of privacy developed by Republican Research Committee's 
Tash Force on Privacy, chaired by Representative Barry M. Goldwater, Jr. 
SOURCE: Louis Frey, Jr., Republican Research Committee Chair-
man, to Republican Colleague, August 21, 1974. Files of Republican 
Research Committee Room 1620, Longworth House Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. 20515. 
The Task Force followed eleven prin° 
ciples in making its recommendations, lis-
ted in Table 3. These principles could 
provide the nucleus necessary to form the 
"umbrella" legislation that is needed. 
Complete, accurate, timely, and relevant 
data are important to both government 
and business for effective operations. The 
Task Force did not oppose data banks as 
such, but did recommend strong safea 
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guards against their misuse. In approving 
the recommendations of the Task Force, 
the Republican Research Committee 
Chairman, Representative Louis Frey, Jr. 
said, "These recommendations and the 
follow-on legislative efforts will ensure 
that the 1984 envisioned by George 
Orwell will remain only fictional." (Frey, 
1974) 
TABLE3 
HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE PRIVACY TASK 
FORCE, PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION PRACTICE 
Number Practice 
1. There should be no personal information system whose existence 
is secret. 
2. Information should not be collected unless the need for it has been 
clearly established in advance. 
3. Information should be appropriate and relevant to the purpose 
for which it has been collected. 
4. Information should not be obtained by illegal, fraudulent, or 
unfair means. 
5. Information should not be used unless it is accurate and current. 
6. Procedures should be established so that an individual knows what 
information is stored, the purpose for which it has been recorded, 
particulars about its use and dissemination, and has the right to 
examine that information. 
7. There should be a clearly prescribed procedure for an individual to 
correct, erase or amend inaccurate, obsolete, or irrelevant 
information. 
8. Any organization collecting, maintaining, using, or disseminating 
personal information should assure its reliability and take precau-
tions to prevent its misuse. 
9. There should be a clearly prescribed procedure for an individual 
to prevent personal information collected for one purpose from 
being used for another purpose without his consent. 
10. The Federal Government should not collect personal information 
except as expressly authorized by law. 
11. That these basic principles apply to both governmental and non-
governmental activities. 
Eleven principles, which guided the specific recommendations of the Re-
publican Research Committee's Task Force on Privacy, are listed. These 
principles could provide the nucleus for necessary "umbrella legislation." 
SOURCE: Louis Frey, Jr., Republican Research Committee Chairman, 
to Republican Colleague, August 21, 1974. Files of Republican Research 





Privacy Act of 1974 
Soon thereafter, Representative 
Goldwater introduced his H.R." 16373 pri-
vacy bill accompanied by House Report 
93-1416. 'During the same time frame 
that the House bill was passed, Senate Bill 
3418, sponsored by Sam Ervin, passed 
the Senate. The Senate bill was amended 
to meet the House requirements and the 
compromise resulted in the passage of 
Public Law 93-579 in December 1974, 
known as the "Privacy Act of 1974." 
Representative William S. Moorehead, 
House Floor Manager of the privacy bill, 
called the measure 'the first comprehen-
sive federal privacy law since the adop-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution.' (Mathiasen, 1975, p. 292) 
The Act was aimed primarily at fed-
eral agencies. However, the Act establish-
ed a Privacy Protection Study commis-
sion which can affect the private sector. 
This Commission is to study automatic 
data processing programs and data banks 
of both governmental and private organi-
zations to determine standards and pro-
cedures for the protection of personal 
information. The Commission is to 
recommend legislation to the President 
and the Congress. (U.S. 'Congress, PL 93-
579, 1974, pp. 10-15) 
Nobody is "Against" Privacy! 
While nobody is "against" privacy, 
the Privacy Act of 1974 and its Commi&o 
sion have been the topic of much discu&o 
sion in both public and private sectors. It' 
appears that "umbrella" legislation will 
result. Bradley gave a typical response to 
the Act and its Commission. He said that 
the Act "provided the major thrust to a 
continuing investigation of information 
processing and the threat to the privacy 
of individuals." 'Bradley further said: 
So while the Commission does 
not have much power in terms of 
what it can mandate for private o,-.. 
ganizations, it does have the autho,... 
ity to investigate and study and, in 
this regard, I think it has a direct im-
pact on all of us in data processing, 
whether governmental or private 
agency. (Bradley, 1975, pp. 34-35) 
In the March-April 1975 issue of the 
Harvard Business Review, we read: 
We can now safely predict that 
within the next year or two privacy 
will affect every organization that 
has computerized data about people, 
for either the federal government will 
act to impose uniform laws through-
out the country or the states will 
take action on their own. (Goldstein, 
1975, p. 63) 
Goldstein's article, centered around 
the increased financial cost of privacy, 
asks the question "Who will pay?" While 
it is natural for the businessman to ask 
who will pay the financial cost for pri-
vacy, it is equally natural for the citizen 
to ask himself "Who will pay (i.e.,' suffer) 
for my loss of privacy?" 
Comprehensive Right 
to Privacy Legislation 
A little over twelve months after the 
Privacy Act of 1974 became law, Repre-
sentatives Barry Goldwater and Edward L 
Koch introduced H.R.' 1984, on January 
23, 1975. ff passed, it would be called the 
"Comprehensive Right to Privacy Act." 
Its purpose is to protect an individual's 
·privacy from state and local governments 
and any public or private entity engaged 
in industrial, commercial, or other simi-
lar business. It would insure safeguards 
for personal privacy by requiring such or-
ganizations to adhere to ten principles of 
information practice. These ten princi-
ples are the same as the first ten of the 
eleven principles delineated by the 
Goldwater Task Fm:ce (see Table 3). (The 
only other change is that the word 
"illegal" is deleted from principle number 
four in the bill.) If H.R.' 1984 passes, it 
would establish a Federal Privacy Board 
to assist an individual unable to resolve a 
privacy dispute with an organization. 
(HR 1984, pp. 17-18) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Most of us have difficulty get-
ting excited about problems until 
it's too late. When Alan Westin, 
Sam Ervin and Cornelius Gallagher 
were beginning to raise questions 
regarding the impact of personal 
recordkeeping upon our lives, most 
of us in data processing manage-
ment failed to recognize the impor-
tance of what they were saying. 
Today, however, the future has 
caught up with us. (Orr, 1976, p.34) 
This review of the brief ten year 
history of the American public and its 
bout with the technological advance-
ment of the computerized data base and 
privacy brings us to the realization that 
the American public has awakened and 
is demanding the broad "umbrella" leg-
islation needed. 
Ten years of hearing and commis-
sion studies brought the Privacy Act of 
1974 into law. As Representative Koch 
said after H.R. 1984 was introduced, 
"We need a broad federal policy to set 
the basic standard for privacy protection 
both in the public and private sector.'' He 
said that the H.R. 1984 bill number was 
"no coincidence.'' (Computer Decisions, 
June 1975, p. 24) 
We know, as Americans, that imple-
menting a bill such as H.R. 1984 may in· 
volve a financial cost to the individual in 
terms of increased costs of goods and ser-
vices; but this financial cost, great as it 
may seem, would not compare to the 
higher cost of individual privacy lost in a 
setting of complete surveillance such as in 
George Orwell's 1984. 
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ABSTRACT 
An increasing awareness of product 
liability has arisen in recent years due 
largely to major product lawsuits and 
recalls, especially with automobiles. This 
paper discusses the effects of product 
liability on engineers and small-business 
managers and gives recommendations on 
how they can best be prepared to mini-
mize product liability problems. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the prices paid for the rapid 
strides made in science and technology is 
in the area of product liability, where the 
technical community currently faces a 
serious challenge. Thousands of cases are 
filed each year, increasingly involving 
engineers and manufacturers. Each year 
30,000 Americans are killed, 110,000 
permanently disabled, and more than 20 
million injured in connection with the use 
of consumer products. (McGuire, 1973, 
p. 61) The number of cases on the dock-
ets of United States courts increased from 
fewer than 10,000 in 1953 to 50,000 in 
1963 and skyrocketed to more than 
500,000 in 1973. (Starts, 1973, p. 11) 
The growth of products liability laws 
must be viewed as a social development 
rather than strictly a legal one. The law is 
merely reflecting new and changing social, 
political, and economic conditions. In 
modern society, there is a trend to spread 
risks, to remove from the individual the 
burden of individual catastrophe, and to 
shift the loss to society as a whole. Irisul'o 
ance has played a major role in this chang-
ing social environment. Compensation for 
the injured party and protection for the 
public are today's legal guideposts. 
To most manufacturers, the rapid 
evolution of product liability laws is 
likely to seem both irrational and unjust, 
and based on ignorance, and avarice, and 
fueled by politics. A widespread lack of 
understanding of the product liability 
problem by the business community has 
led to an astronomical number of claims, 
judgments, and large last-minute out-of-
court settlements. It has also heightened 
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the public awareness of its legal rights in 
cases of product liability accidents. It is 
the intention here to show the basis for 
product liability, how it affects engineers 
in various areas, and how a businessman 
can be alert to averting product liability 
problems. 
LEGAL HISTORY 
Early in the development of negli-
gence law, the courts did not hold a 
manufacturer responsible for injury to 
another party unless there existed some 
kind of a contract between the two, 
giving rise to a relationship called privity. 
The typical interpretation of the law was 
that if privity did not exist, then there 
was no liability. The historical basis of 
this English common law rule dates back 
to a decision in 1842. In this case, 
Winterbottom vs. Wright, the plaintiff 
was the driver of a mail coach. It broke 
down, injuring the driver, who sued the 
manufacturer on the ground that the 
coach was defective. The court denied 
the claim, asserting that there was no con-
tractual privity between the driver and 
the manufacturer of the coach. 
For some time, even though the 
manufacturer could have foreseen injuries 
to others, his duty was limited only to 
those with whom he had contractual pri-
vity. This rule was later modified in the 
case of manufacturers of dangerous 
products, such as poisons and explosives, 
on the grounds that the manufacturer 
should have been able to anticipate the 
accident, and was therefore responsible 
even though there was no contractual 
relationship. 
Another milestone occurred in 1916, 
in the case of MacPherson vs. Buick 
Motor Company, wherein the plaintiff 
claimed that his injury, caused by the 
collapse of a defective wheel, could have 
been prevented, had the Buick Company 
inspected the wheel properly. The court 
disregarded the wheel issue, but declared 
on a broader aspect, that a motor vehicle 
was a dangerous instrument, and, just as 
with explosives, privity would not be 
required for liability. 
Further erosion of the privity rule 
led to a 1963 California case ruling, 
which has become the precedent for 
product liability cases throughout the 
United States. The court decision, rela-
ting to "strict liability in tort", means 
that a plaintiff in a product liability case 
needs only to prove that the product was 
defective when it left the control of the 
manufacturer and that the defect was the 
cause of the damages he suffered. He 
need not prove that the manufacturer was 
in any way culpable for causing the de-
fect. In fact, as John V. Brennan of the 
United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. 
describes the situation, "a completely 
faultless manufacturer can be held liable 
under the rule of strict liability. (Brennan, 
1975, p. 44) All that is required is to 
show that there was indeed a product 
defect, which could be any one of the 
following: a) defective manufacturing, 
b) defective design, or c) defective mar-
keting, in that buyers might have been 
misinformed about proper use of the 
product or potential dangers connected 
with its use. 
Out of this background has come the 
current philosophy that a manufacturer 
of an article is liable for the injuries of 
the user, provided that the injury was 
caused by a defect in the product and 
the user used the product in a reason• 
able manner. Brennan describes the pub-
lic policy considerations behind the appli· 
cation of the doctrine of strict liability in 
tort, as laid down in a recent court case, 
Branderburger vs. Toyota Motor Sales 
USA, Inc. 
1. The manufacturer can anticipate 
some hazards and guard against 
their recurrence, which the con· 
sumer cannot do. 
2. The cost of injury may be over-
whelming to the person injured, 
while the risk of injury can be 
insured by the manufacturer and 
the cost of doing this can be dis-
tributed among the public as a 
business expense. 
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3. It is in the public interest to dis-
courage the marketing of defec-
tive products. 
4. It is in the public interest to 
place responsibility for injury 
upon the manufacturer respon· 
sible for its reaching the market. 
5. This responsibility should also 
be placed upon the retailer and 
the wholesaler of the defective 
product, in order that they may 
act as the conduit through which 
liability may flow to reach the 
manufacturer, where ultimate 
responsibility lies. 
6. Because of the complexity of 
present day manufacturing proc-
esses and their secretiveness, the 
injured plaintiff's ability to 
prove negligent conduct by a 
producer is almost impossible. 
7. The consumer does not have the 
ability to investigate for himself 
the soundness of the product. 
8. The consumer's vigilance has 
been lulled by advertising, mar-
keting devices, and trademarks. 
{Ibid., p. 44) 
Product liability defense is thus prac-
tically non-existent. The major question 
is whether an injury was caused by a de-
fective product, and this question must 
be decided by a jury. 
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY ACT 
A major extension of the federal 
government's involvement with product 
liability came with the passage of the 
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) in 
1972. Under this act, if a company makes 
or markets a consumer product or any of 
its component parts that company almost 
inevitably becomes accountable to the 
federal government - generally to the 
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Consumer Products Safety Commission, 
but to other agencies as well. The Chair-
man of the Commission, Richard O. 
Simpson, is described by Kiebala (1975, 
p. 34) as having made it clear that he and 
his staff of 750 people, working out of 
fourteen field offices, will enforce the law 
energetically, and that violations can 
result in fines of $500,000 and criminal 
penalties of one year in jail. 
For most companies, however, the 
threat of penalties is not as ominous as 
the possible high cost of compliance. 
Should the Commission find that a prod· 
uct constitutes a significant safety hazard 
to consumers, it can order retailers, dis.-
tribu tors, wholesalers, and manufacturers 
to recall, repair, or replace it, or to refund 
the price to the buyers. This action can 
follow the reporting of the existence of 
any substantial hazard. As required by 
the act, anyone involved in the manufac-
ture, wholesaling, distribution, or sale of 
consumer products is required to report 
such hazards to the Commission within 
twenty-four hours of discovery. This em" 
phasis on self-regulation will require basic 
modifications in most companies' res-
ponse to problems of product liability. 
On the bright side, one major benefit 
of the CPSA will be the eventual develop-
ment of a unified national product liabil-
ity code to replace individual state codes. 
This should simplify operations for com-
panies whose goods are sold in more than 
one state, as can happen easily even with-
out the manufacturer,s knowledge. If the 
states eventually assume enforcement, 
individual state product liability codes are 
likely to be substantially identical. 
Another major benefit of the CPSA 
will be the development, for the first time, 
of broad and reliable statistics on the per-
formance of consumer products. A step 
in this direction has already been taken 
with the establishment of the National 
Electronic Injury Surveillance System. 
Under this system, 119 hospitals strate-
gically located throughout the country 
report all injuries treated in their emer-
gency rooms that appear to have involved 
the use of consumer products, These 
reports, which list accidents by frequency, 
type, and product, are published month-
ly and are available to the public on a 
subscription basis. They should prove in-
valuable to manufacturers in averting 
future problems. 
THE DESIGN ENGINEER 
The previously mentioned case of 
MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Company 
not only eliminated the privity rule, but 
also established the rule that the manu-
' facturer has a duty to design and manu-
'facture his product carefully so that it 
is reasonably safe for the use for which 
it was intended. This leads to considera-
tion of one of the most serious areas of 
product liability: defects in design. 
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There are many failure-of-design 
situations for which the design engineer 
must be on guard. David Fromson, 
General Counsel of the National Fluid 
Power Association, groups these situa-
tions into three basic areas: 
1. Where the concealed danger 
arises directly out of an im-
perfect design. Such was the 
case where the plaintiff sued the 
manufacturer of a die-casting 
machine for an injury sustained 
while operating the machine. 
The defendant's selection of a 
free-floating spool, for use in 
one of the valves of the machine, 
was questioned by the jury in 
light of expert testimony that 
the use of such a spool was un-
safe. 
2. Where the manufacturer neglects 
to furnish a needed safety device 
customarily used in the industry. 
Such was the case where a sus-
pension plug designed for use 
with oil well equipment lacked a 
safety factor adequate to with-
stand the live load impacts. The 
result was that in three cases 
heavy equipment dropped 10,000 
feet into the wells, making it 
necessary to abandon the remain-
ing oil. In this case, the supplier 
of the equipment was held liable. 
3. Where the design itself calls for 
materials of inadequate strength. 
Such was the case where the 
manufacturer was sued for injury 
when the disc of a wheel balanD 
cer attached to a rotating tire 
came off and injured the plain· 
tiff. Plaintiff's expert testified 
that the disc came off because 
the failure occurred in the weak· 
est section of the bolt, caused by 
improper design of the machine 
which resulted in metal fatigue. 










TIME FINAL DESIGN 
RELEASE TO 
MANUFACTURE 
In reaching decisions, the courts are 
placing substantial reliance on determina-
tions of whether a design has been accep-
ted throughout the industry and whether 
other manufacturers use safer designs. 
Thus, it behooves the design engineer to 
be on the alert for possible defects before 
manufacturing ever starts. The place to 
start is in the drafting room, followed by 
a rather thorough design review. Efforts 
in this area will have other benefits as 
well. Jacobs (1975, p. 34) shows in 
Figure 1 how costs of implementing a 
design change can be lowered by use of 





Figure 1 Cost Benefit of a Design Review 
The figure illustrates that the use of a design review significantly reduces the average 
cost of a product's manufacture from the final design release to customer delivery. 
(Source: Jacobs, R.M., "Design Review: A Liability Preventer," Mechanical Engi0 
neering, August, 1975,,P. 34) 
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He also shows, in Figure 2, a typical 
checklist to aid in the review process. The 
pay-off from a design review, then, is two-
fold: not only will it decrease the likeli-
hood of future lawsuits, but it will also 
provide immediate manufacturing cost 
savings. 
THE CONSULTING ENGINEER 
Lawsuits against consulting engineer-
ing firms are a fact of life. If someone is 
injured on a construction project site, or 
if a client is unsatisfied with the quality 
of an apartment complex or the perform-
ance of a sewage collection system, the 
consulting engineer may well be sought 
out and charged with liability. According 
to Sidney Robin and Joseph Syrnick of 
the American Society of Civil Engineers, 
one consulting firm in four can expect 
to have a liability claim filed against it 
in any given year. (Robin, 1975, p. 66) 
Currently, new claims against design con· 
suiting professionals exceed 210 per 
month across the United States. Six out 
of ten of these claims require court liti-
gation, the remainder being settled out 
of court. 
One area where liability claims have 
an above-average frequency is in specula. 
tive building projects. A single owner may 
build and later lease or sell an office build-
ing or apartment complex. Often he will 
hire the same architect, the same structur-
al engineer, and the same contractor for 
several jobs. These parties may become 
careless in drawing contracts and specifi· 
cations because of their familiar working 
relationship. Then when something goes 
wrong on a job, it may be difficult to pin 
down responsibility to one of the parties, 
and litigation frequently follows. A liabil-
ity claim is sometimes initiated by the 
owner, sometimes by the contractor, and 
sometimes by a third party. For similar 
reasons, it is most dangerous to start any 
job before contract discussions are final· 
ized in writing. 
While the engineer should not design 
over-defensively, he must constantly be 
aware that potential lawsuits lie latent on 
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every sidewalk, roadway, and building 
site. When a professional offers his ser· 
vices to a client, he is an expert, account-
able for a high performance standard 
within his area of expertise. 
THE ENGINEER AS A 
TECHNICAL EXPERT 
In the legal arena of product liabil-
ity litigation, scientists and engineers are 
called upon to evaluate diverse products 
involved in injuries and to communicate 
their findings in an environment that of· 
ten appears foreign to their own technical 
problem-solving processes. The culmina-
tion of the expert's testimony is his opin· 
ion on the issues of defect, causation, or 
both. If is the attorney's role to have that 
opinion delivered with as high a degree of 
certainty as he can possibly elicit. The 
engineer, however, is torn between the 
attorney's desire for increased certitude, 
and his own technological assessment of 
the limitations inherent in reaching his 
opinion. These limitations come from var-
ious sources: the state of the physical evi-
dence, and the extent, adequacy, and 
reliability of data from testing programs. 
The tension that is experienced by 
any technical expert who testifies in a 
product liability trial is both unhealthy 
and unnecessary to the litigation process. 
Some degree of stress is an integral part 
of decision-making when different con-
clusions based on different assessments of 
the same data can be reached: engineers 
are trained to deal with such dilemmas. 
The problem lies in the lack of communi-
cation between technical experts and the 
legal community. Indeed, a jury which 
senses this lack of communication may 
formulate its own theory of the case, 
rendering the engineer's testimony useless. 
Thus, a continuing substantive dialogue 
between the legal and technical communi· 
ties is essential for the refinement of the 
product liability process; this dialogue 
must be one in which the engineer as a 
technical specialist can be true to himself 
while operating within a strong and re-







1. General Manager 
2. Engineering Manager 








Date ___ _ 
Date ___ _ 
Date ___ _ 
Date ___ _ 
4. Chairman of Design Review is ------------------
5. Secretary of Design Review is ------------------
6. Participants (and Observers, if any) are: 
a. ____________ _ 
b. ____________ _ 
c. ____________ _ 




Design Review Minutes 
Design Review Final Report 
8. Issuance of Orientation Notice 
Issuance of Design Review 
Notice - Agenda 
Issuance of Minutes 





Goal Date Actual Date 
Figure 2. Design Review Check List 
The figure shows a typical design review check list to be used to assure that all 
elements of an effective review process are addressed. (Jacobs, 197 5, p. 34) 
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LESSENING LIABILITY 
For the most part, businessmen have 
responded to the product liability problem 
by stressing production-related tasks such 
as purchasing better materials and improv-
ing quality control. While this approach is 
entirely proper, it is also incomplete. 
Needed is a more comprehensive, respon· 
sive approach which considers product 
liability from the perspective of the firm 
as a whole. 
A checklist of factors that might be 
helpful in preventing a product liability 
problem from arising has been selected 
from recommendations to small-busi-
ness managers (Olstrom, 1975, p. 9) and 
is presented as follows: 
L Establish objectives 
A. Creation of a safe product 
B. Safe performance under 
ordinary conditions 
C. Safe performance under 
extraordinary circum· 
stances 
D. Accurate information to 
the buyer concerning 
product usage 
E. Coordination of informa-
tion to marketing functions 
F. Acquisition of product ex-
perience records. 
IL Develop a plan of action 
A. Engineering design review 
B. Manufacturing quality 
control 
c. Product use tests 
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D. Review of product claims, 
as shown in advertisements, 
technical manuals, etc. 
E. Maintenance of close rela-
tionships with marketing 
personnel, wholesalers, 
and retailers 
F. Monitoring of relative envi-
ronments, including: 
1. Product environment, 
by reviewing warranty 
card comments sub-
mitted by customers 
and technical informa-




ment by reviewing 
newspaper and maga-
zine articles on prod-
uct liability, custom-
er complaints, and in-
formation gathered 
from salesmen 
3. External environment, 
by reviewing profes-
sional and trade asso-
ciation reports, indus-
try journals, Small 
Business Administra-
tion reports, and Con-
sumer Product Safety 
Commission reports 
IIL Prepare for contingency events 
by: 
A. Investing in adequate lia-
bility insurance 
B. Preparing a plan for: 








2. Withdrawal of prod-
ucts 





bility for product liability 
at the top management 
level 
Delegating day-to-day re-
sponsibility for product 
liability for product lia-
bility to one person 
C. Making awareness of prod-
uct liability organization-
ally permanent 
The key issue for the firm is to recog-
nize that this problem is of such impor-
tance that it demands a carefully planned 
action program. As noted above, it 
should include the establishment of 
objectives, development of a plan of 
action, assignment of the responsibility 
for its execution at an appropriate organ-
izational level, and the communication of 
necessary information. Only through such 
an organized approach can an enterprise 
develop an integrated and effective strat-
egy to meet the product liability challenge. 
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ABSTRACT 
The energy from the sun is free;' it is 
sure and continuous. Why not use it? Its 
application to heating of homes is a log-
ical beginning, and mankind is finally 
moving in this direction. This paper is a 
brief assessment of the obstacles and im· 
plications of solar heating technology. 
U. S. Federal Government policy and 
programs are discussed as well as conse-
quences for industry and business. 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to pre-
sent a brief technology assessment {TA) 
of the use of 1olar energy to heat residen· 
tial dwelling. A major technological 
change such as solar heating is frequently 
accelerated by exogenous factors such as 
an oil embargo or a national energy crisis. 
Fortunately, our national leaders are 
now recognizing the need for TA to pro-
vide themselves with the technical infor· 
mation needed to make rational decisions. 
This was demonstrated by the U.S. Con· 
gress when they enacted The Technology 
Assessment Act of 1972. 
Energy from the sun is free and is ex-
pected to continue to be available for 
another five billion years. With these cre-
dentials, why hasn't solar heating had 
more widespread application? Solar heat-
ing of domestic hot water (DHW) was 
frequently used in this country up until 
the 1940's; and it is used currently in 
Australia, Japan,Israel, India and U.S.S.R. 
(ERDA, 1975, p. 2) Although cheap and 
convenient fossil fuels have made solar 
heating unattractive to much of the world, 
there are "hidden" costs associated with 
the use of conventional fuels - such as 
costs to future generations who will bear 
the consequences of our excessive use of 
natural resources, and environmental 
damage. 
At the 1954 New Delhi S,mposium, 
it was declared that heating of homes was 
one of the easiest ways to utilize solar 
energy; the symposium participants pre-
dicted that thirteen million homes would 
be solar-heated by 1975 if an accelerated 
program was adopted. (Daniels, 1956, 
p. 129) Obviously, this prophesy has not 
been fulfilled. Why not? This paper will 
explore some of the reasons why this 
technology transfer has been so slow. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
There are several alternatives to fossil 
fuels as energy sources. At this time, the 
two most practical are nuclear power and 
solar power. Solar heating power has the 
unique advantage over nuclear generated 
power of operating effectively on a very 
small scale: i.e., individual residential 
units. An added benefit of solar heating 
is the partial fulfillment of the homeown-
er's desire to be sulf-sufficient and live 
within nature's endowment. The home-
owner, however, has been deterred from 
using solar power by the lack of available 
units and the relatively high cost of ac-
quisition. Other deterrents to the wide-
spread use of solar heating units will be 
discussed in a later section of this paper, 
but first a typical system will be briefly 
described so that readers may refer to a 
common conceptual system. 
Figure 1 shows a typical residential 
solar space heating and DHW heating 
system. (Beck, 1976, p. 18) The basic 
components are: 
1. solar collector 
2. heat storage system 
3. energy transfer fluid -
usually water 
4. source of supplemental energy 
1 A technology assessment may be defined as the systematic study of the effects on 
society that may occur when a technology is introduced, extended or modified, with 
special emphasis on the impacts that are unintended, indirect or delayed. (Coates 
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Figure 1 Conceptual Schematic For Space and DHW Heating 
The figure shows a typical residential solar space heating and domestic hot water 
heating system with six basic components: 1) solar collector, 2) heat storage system, 
3) energy transfer fluid, 4) source of supplemental energy, 5) space heating distribu· 
tion system and 6) control systems. 
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5. space heating distribution 
system - air ducts or hot 
water radiators 
6. a control system 
The system for DHW functions is a 
tempering or preheating cycle before the 
water is raised to its final delivery temper· 
ature by a conventional water heater. 
This process is ideally adapted to heating 
swimming pools. A solar energy collec-
tion system can be more efficiently used 
on a year-round basis if heat-activated air 
conditioning equipment is added. This 
equipment would work on an absorption 
or Rankine refrigeration cycle utilizing 
heat generated in the summer. 
An obvious obstacle to the harness.-
ing of solar energy is that it is not con-
stantly available, and so a storage system 
must be provided. However, about one-
third of the solar energy generated is 
direct radiation, while two-thirds is dif· 
fused radiation. This is why a consider· 
able amount of heat is still available on 
partly cloudy or hazy days. A system 
must be provided to collect and concen-
trate this solar energy. The amount of 
solar energy received at a location depends 
upon: a) hour of the day b) day of the soi-
ar year c) amount of clouds present d) the 
latitude, and e) the altitude. The higher 
the latitude and the lower the altitude, 
the lower the amount of energy received. 
(Beck, 1976, p. 1) However, regional var-
iations in energy cost are more significant 
than regional variations in the available 




One of the disadvantages associated 
with solar energy is that the systems are 
dependent upon the incidence of sunlight; 
therefore, those locations at latitude 
further from the equator, or those with 
frequently cloudy skies, will find such 
systems less efficient. Solar heating also 
performs worst in the coldest weather, 
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when it is needed most. Another disad· 
vantage is that the systems are consid· 
erably larger and heavier than conven-
tional heating and cooling systems. 
Evidence exists that solar heaters may not 
have as long a life as conventional furnaces. 
(Beck, op. cit., p. 3) 
There is presently a limitation on 
the availability of the solar system com-
ponents, and their level of performance 
and reliability is largely unproven. Like-
wise, there is lack of data required to 
optimize system designs to specific build-
ings and locations. 
Possible restrictions of existing build· 
ing codes and inexperience of city offi-
cials in dealing with new requirements act 
as deterrents to the development of solar 
energy. Financial institutions may be re-
luctant to provide mortgages for homes 
with solar heating systems, and private 
and government institutions may be re-
luctant to insure those mortgages. 
There is the possibility that difficul-
ties would be encountered with regard to 
"sun rights"; thus, new zoning and land-
use patterns may be needed. (ERDA, 
1975, p. 11) One can always fantasize 
a myriad of small problems, but these 
appear to be far from insurmountable 
and exist only in the short-run. It seems 
that the only significant impediment to 
rapid introduction of solar systems is 
their higher acquisition cost. Again, this 
is a short-run problem caused by the 
very small production volume (almost 
one-of-a-kind). 
Currently there are only about one 
hundred buildings in the U.S. using solar 
heat. (Glaser, op. cit., p. 10) A current 
cost estimate is eight dollars per square 
foot for a flat plate collector system, not 
installed. The price will decrease as the 
market steadily increases; however, 
this will occur much faster if the federal 
government offers incentives. (Ibid, p. 11) 
The nature of these incentives is a primary 
output of a major program coordinated 
by the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA) and involv-
ing the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and twelve other 
federal agencies. (ERDA, op. cit., p. 59) 
CURRENT ACTION 
Current action is centered on the 
National Program for Solar Heating and 
Cooling coordinated by ERDA. This 
program is charted in Figure 2 and calls 
for a demonstration of residential and 
commercial heating systems by the end 
of 1977. The American Society for Tes-
ting Materials (ASTM) has a new subcom-
CALENDAR YEAR 1974 1975 
mittee on Solar Energy Utilization for 
component evaluation, reliability and dura· 
bility studies. Safety standards are being 
formulated by the American National 
Standards Institute {ANSI) to protect 
homeowners and commercial interests 
from substandard building equipment. 
(ASTM, 1975, p. 2) The Solar Energy 
Research Institute is in the final planning 
stages by ERDA. (Fannin, 1975, p. 3) 


















OF SOLAR HEATING 




RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TEST 
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" DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 
Figure 2 Summary Schedule of Federal Program 
for Solar Heating and Cooling 
Depicted is a time table for Solar heating and cooling developed by a Energy Research 
and Development Administration; the schedule calls for a demonstration of residential 
and commercial heating systems by the end of 1977. (ERDA, 1975, p. 19) 
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Federal Government Policy 
Beginning with the Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendment of 1972 (P.L. 
92-500), Congress made its first attempt 
to measure implications and ramifications 
of specific public policy and its impact on 
our civilization. (Choates, 1974, p. 30) 
Several laws have been enacted which are 
guiding much of the current solar heating 
effort. These include: 
1. Solar Heating and Cooling Dem-
onstration Act of 1974. (P.L. 
93-409) 
2. Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974. P.L. 93-438) 
3. Solar Energy Research, Develol>' 
ment and Demonstration Act of 
1974. (P.L. 93-4 73) 
4. Federal Nonnuclear Energy Re-
search and Development Act of 
1974. (P.L. 93-577) (ERDA, 
1975, p. 1) 
The U.S. Senate is now considering 
legislation similar to that passed by the 
House of Representatives (H.R. 6860) 
that would provide tax credits for solar 
energy equipment used in residences. 
(Glaser, 1975, p. 8) The overall goal of 
the federal program enacted by the 93rd 
Congress is to stimulate industrial and 
commercial capabilities to produce and 
distribute solar heating and cooling 
systems. 
It is believed that without govern-
ment stimulus, widespread application 
would not take place in this country be-
fore the end of the century. (ERDA, 
1975, p. 1) However, it is hoped that 
as a result of the ERDA Program, solar 
heating and cooling will be competitive 
with other energy sources by 1980. The 
targets for new solar systems outlined by 
ERDA are: 
1. 1980 - one per cent of annual 
residential and commercial build-
ing starts plus retrofit of 2500 
residential units and 200 com .. 
mercial units. This will save the 
equivalent of 10,000 barrels of 
oil per day. 
2. 1985 - ten per cent of annual 
residential and commercial build· 
ing starts plus retrofit of 25,000 
residential units and 1000 com-
mercial units. This will save the 
equivalent of 100,000 barrels of 
oil per day. (Ibid, p. 9) 
Portions of the ten-year program are 
illustrated by Figure 3. 
Since about twenty-five per cent of 
our energy is used to heat and cool build-
ings, the savings if even one per cent were 
heated and cooled by solar energy would 
amount to thirty million barrels of oil a 
year. (Ibid, p. 2) Frank Zarb, former 
Administrator of the Federal Energy 
Administration contended that: 
••• Solar heating and cooling can and 
should make a significant contribu-
tion to our total energy production 
by 1985 - going well beyond the 
goals of the demonstration program. 
(Ibid, p. 71) 
Needed Policy Changes 
There are several public barriers and 
constraints that need attention through 
policy changes in the near term. Some of 
these are: 
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1. building code modification 
2. land use, zoning and "sun rights" 
3. property tax and assessment 
incentives 
4. mortgage and home improve-
ment financing based upon life 
cycle costing rather than acqui-
sition costing 
5. need for "truth in energy" 
labeling on solar systems to pro-
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TABLE A-II-1 
NUMBER OF ANNUAL HOUSING STARTS 
AND THE EQUIVALENT ANNUAL FUEL SAVINGS USING SOLAR ENERGY 
1976 
Annual Starts 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 
Cumulative Starts 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 
Annual Fuel Savings 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 









2 In thousands of barrels of all equivalent energy saved per year where: 




























Dwelling unit ft2-year Dwelling unit 5,600,000 BTU 5.6 X lOC Dwelling unit-year Dwelling unit-year 
TABLE A-11-2 
NUMBER OF ANNUAL COMMERCIAL STARTS 
AND THE EQUIVALENT ANNUAL FUEL SAVINGS USING SOLAR ENERGY 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Annual Starts 1 .................. 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.5 2 5 7 1 15 15 
Cumulative Starts 1 ............... 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.64 2.64 7.64 14.64 24.64 39.64 54.64 
Annual Fuel Savings 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 12.8 44.9 205.4 847.4 2452.4 4699.4 7909.4 12, 724.4 17,539 
1 In thousands of units. 





15,ooo ft2 300 x 107 x o.6 
X X .6 solar substitution = -------------
Commercial unit 5.6 X 10c Commercial unit-year 
Figure 3. New Construction Schedules for the 10-Year Federal Program 
The two tables outline the expected developments and equivalent annual 
fuel savings of solar heating and cooling systems for the ten-year period 




OF SOLAR HEATING 
Usually one of the first ideas to come 
to mind regarding the effects of solar 
heating concerns pollution: air pollution, 
water pollution, thermal pollution, noise 
pollution. Solar energy is unique in that 
it is inherently nonpolluting. (Beck, 1976, 
p. 3) There is no solid waste disposal 
problem and no need to store a flamma-
ble fuel supply. In fact, if the unit is in-
stalled on the roof, it doesn't even require 
extra land space. It provides substantial 
freedom from effects of fuel price in-
creases that are inevitable, and it conserves 
irreplaceable fossil fuels. 
There are a great many secondary 
advantages and positive implications in 
the concept of solar heating of homes. On 
a macro scale, solar energy will allow set-
tlement of remote areas of the earth, 
whereas there is a high correlation be-
tween areas of abundant sunlight and the 
arid, sparsely populated regions of the 
world. (Black 1956, p. 138) This should 
help ease urban crowding. Solar heating 
and cooling and solar engines for pump-
ing water would promote development 
and modernization of remote regions. 
Energy is required to produce solar 
equipment and it has been estimated that 
it would take about one year for an in-
stallation to save the energy needed to 
produce it. Over the life of the equip-
ment, about twenty times that energy 
would be saved. (Glaser, 1975, p. 12) For 
the U.S., this would benefit our balance 
of trade by reducing fuel imports and by 
providing a new outlet: the exportation 
of solar equipment. 
Implications for Industry and Business 
The production of solar equipment 
will have far-reaching implications for 
U.S. industry. There will be increased de-
mand for structural materials such as steel, 
aluminum and concrete; for fabrication 
materials such as copper, tin, plastics, 
glass; and for organic materials such 
as sealants, ethylene glycol, foams, and 
special paints. 
Rapid growth of a new industry for 
solar climate control technology and sys-
tem fabrication will occur. This in turn, 
will spawn new businesses to distribute 
and maintain such systems. Work will be 
created for the building industry through 
the installation of systems in new struc-
tures as well as the modification of ex-
isting houses. There are some very creative 
opportunities for the control systems in-
dustry. This list of positive implications 
is far from exhaustive but it illustrates 
the widespread effects of such a techno-
logical change. 
ECOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Ecological implications of solar en-
ergy are positive; i.e., ecological damage 
will be prevented by the introduction of 
solar heating systems on a widespread 
basis. Two of the potentially serious 
problems resulting from the burning of 
fossil fuels are: a) increased carbon diox-
ide (C02) in the atmosphere and b) sus-
pended particles. Suspended particles 
have the effect of increasing cloud for-
mation. The co2, which has been increas-
ing about 0.2 per cent each year since 
1958, has the detrimental effect of chang-
ing the earth's temperature by affecting 
the solar transmission qualities of the at-
mosphere. (SCEP, 1970, p. 11) It has 
been predicted that co2 emissions from 
the burning of fossil fuels throughout the 
world will be 26 billion metric tons per 
year. (Ibid, p. 304) 
Pollution is not only a problem for 
rich, developed countries, but less devel-
oped countries (LDC's) frequently have 
considerable pollution because of larger 
populations and less efficient processes. 
However, the LDC's often regard the 
rising concern for environmental deterio-
ration among the developed nations as a 
plot to deprive them of their rightful 
share of the technological revolution. The 
notion that man will exhaust his natural 
resources has not been accepted in the 
LDC's; they believe that growth should 




Certainly, pollution is a worldwide 
problem and it will require some very 
imaginative and farsighted international 
cooperation. Solar energy systems may 
facilitate this cooperation as they become 
more competitive with fossil fuel systems. 
SUMMARY 
In the past, man has assigned high 
priorities to first;..order effects, such as 
energy, at the expense of second-order 
effects, such as pollution. The devel-
opment of all nations is directly related 
to energy; however, nations have re-
garded pollution as an evil but neces-
sary price of progress. It was easier to 
simply move away from it (to the sub-
urbs} than to work on reducing it. The 
world is now too small to just move 
away. 
Factors that are helping to promote 
solar heating in the U.S. and, to varying 
degrees, throughout the world are: 
1. 'rising conventional fuel costs 
2. 'awareness of the need for ener-
gy conservation 
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3. governmental support for devel-
opment of solar energy applica-
tions 
4. increased availability of residen-
tial solar heating units, and 
5. consumer desire to reduce depen-
dence upon conventional energy 
supplies (Op. cit., Glaser, p. 8) 
Many experts are certain that we will 
eventually depend primarily on controlled 
solar energy, but there are barriers which 
will slow its utilization. The primary bar-
rier is the relatively high acquisition cost, 
while actually the life-cycle costs are 
lower. The federal government is moving 
to hasten progress through a program of 
research, development, demonstrations, 
incentives, technology transfer, and 
education. 
The acceptance and use of solar sys-
tems will be very beneficial to U.S. "indus-
try, business, and commerce. It may be 
a new avenue to international technology 
transfer, increased world cooperation and 
ecological understanding. 
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